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I. INTRODUCTION
The workplace is a fulcrum of modem life: both economic survival and the
character of our daily lives turn on access to work, and on its terms. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964' ("Title VIIP) is a lever, designed to make work a force for
equality and to reverse its historical role as a manufacturer of gender and race
hierarchy. Congress, the courts, and commentators have long recognized that such a
transformation cannot be imposed by law alone but instead requires the active
cooperation of myriad individuals and institutions; thus, law should recognize,
nurture, and protect such private initiative.
The importance of rank-and-file resistance to discrimination, and legal protection
for it, was recently illustrated by the experience of David Childress and six other
white men-officers in the traditionally white, male bastion of policing in
Richmond 2 -who found themselves in a work environment inimical to Title VIl's
vision.3 Their commanding officer invited themto share in his nostalgia for an all-
white, all-male force, a nostalgia grounded in contempt for the women he called his
1.42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
2. See infra note 62.
3. Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 938 (E.D. Va. 1995), claims
dismissed by 919 F. Supp. 216 (E.D. Va. 1996), vacated and remanded by 120 F.3d 476 (4th
Cir. 1997) (panel opinion),panel opinion vacated and judgment below aff'd en banc by 134
F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
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"pussy posse," including the African-American officer he labeled a "mother-fucking
worthless black bitch."4 Childress and the others, however, did the right thing: they
rejected the call to close ranks as white men against race and gender interlopers.
Instead, theyjoined their black and female coworkers to demand that their supervisor
be disciplined for undermining the cross-race, cross-gender teamwork that they
asserted was essential to safe and effective policing.5 When this vision for their
workplace was rebuffed with harassment, threats of discharge, and adverse transfers,
many of these officers sought relief under Title VII for "a hostile working
environment in which the police officers were divided by gender and race."6 But a
federal court itself divided the plaintiffs by gender and race, allowing the women's
claims to go forward while dismissing the white, male officers' suit on the ground
that they faced merely a workplace "biased in their favor."7
These events must be analyzed in the context of a growing understanding of how
coworker behavior and shop- and office-level work culture act as agents of
inequality,8 even as the battle against employment discrimination shifts from overt,
top-down forms to equally pervasive but often subtle practices.' At stake is not only
4. Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 938.
5.Id.
6. Brief forAppellants at 17, Childress v. City of Richmond, 120 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997)
(No. 96-1585).
7. Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 939 (emphasis in original).
8. See also JACQUELINE JONES, AMERICAN WORK: FOUR CENTURIES OFBLACKAND WHrTE
LABOR 14, 302, 310, 312, 349 (1998) (demonstrating historically how certain jobs and
occupations have been coded as "white" or "black" and how white workers have enforced
racial restrictions on black coworkers);Vicki Schultz, TellingStoriesAbout Women and Work:
Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the
Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1749, 1832-39 (1990) [hereinafter Schultz,
Telling Stories] (analyzing sexual harassment as a practice that enforces sex segregation at
work by deterring entry into male-dominated job categories); see also infra note 9. See
generally Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998)
(arguing that sexual harassment should be understood as rooted in workplace cultures that fuse
competence and gender) [hereinafter Schultz, ReconceptualizingSexualHarassment]; Kathryn
Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1169 (1998)
(arguing that sexual harassment reflects male workers' struggle to preserve and enforce
masculine norms in the workplace).
9. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161
(1995) (criticizing the emphasis in employment discrimination doctrine on self-conscious bias
and arguing for the importance of remedying unconsciously biased evaluations); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (discussing the pervasiveness and varietyofunconscious racism);
Thomas F. Pettigrew & Joanne Martin, Shaping the Organizational Context for Black
American Inclusion, 43 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 41 (1987) (analyzing the social psychological
processes that disadvantage African-Americans at work, even in the absence offormal practices
of exclusion); Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-First Century
Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations, I U. PA. LAB. &EMP. L. 639 (1998) (arguing that
2002)
INDIA NA LA W JO URAAL
categorical race- and sex-based exclusion and subordination-whether women and
racial minorities will have access equal to white men's-but also the race and gender
terms on which inclusion is offered: what workers must do to be white or manly
enough for the job. 0 These two questions are intimately related. Workplace cultures
intertwine being a good worker with being a good white or man, thereby both
excluding nonwhites and women and enforcingparticular expectations ofhow whites
or men should behave."
Cases like Childress show that these stereotypes may address how employees
interact across race and gender lines, and, in particular, may demand cross-race or
cross-sex interactions that are themselves exclusionary or subordinating in character.
Such race- and sex-specific norms affect not only relations among coworkers but all
aspects of workers' lives on and off the job. On the job, workers deal daily with
customers, clients, prisoners, patients, and tenants; and both coworkers and
employers know and care about how workers relate to others as parents, neighbors,
spouses, and citizens.'
The law should encourage and protect workers who reject discriminatory
relationships and who instead adopt Title VII's vision of workplace equality and its
catalytic role in eroding other forms of discrimination. The officers in Childress felt
that their interests aligned them with women and African-American coworkers,
aligned in a commitment to teamwork and mutual support despite their supervisors'
invitation to affimn their whiteness and masculinity by driving women and minorities
employment discrimination law needs to adapt to the shift in workplace organization from
centralized hierarchy to flexible, decentralized work teams).
10. Abrams, supra note 8, at 1209 (discussing "forms of harassment... concerned not
with resisting women directly but with asserting the primacy of male prerogatives or norms in
the workplace"); see also Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection
ofRace and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 394-95 (arguing that employer grooming standards
both exclude black women and lock white women into stereotypical images of white
femininity); Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afierword: Embracing the Tar Baby-LatCrit
Theory and the Sticky Mess ofRace, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 499, 552 (1998) ("The project of black
liberation is left incomplete if employers are prevented from refusing to hire or promote
African-Americans but are free to force them to look and act as 'white' as possible.");
Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997)
(arguing that sexual harassment is a means by which men express and impose gender-specific
norms of sexuality); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices ofAmerica: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and
a Jurisprudence for the Latest Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1375 (1991) (analyzing
discrimination based on accent as a practice that enforces conformity to idealized white speech
patterns); Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 1774-77 (analyzing
harassment of men by men as enforcing work-related expectations of masculinity).
11. See Caldwell, supra note 10, at 394-95; Phil Cohen, Laboring Under Whiteness, in
DISPLACING WHITENESS: ESSAYS IN SOCIALAND CULTURALCRITICISM 244 (RuthFrankenberg
ed., 1995); Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note-8, at 1755.
12. See Karen L. Proudford, Notes on the Intra-Group Origins of Inter-Group Conflict
in Organizations: Black-White Relations as an Exemplar, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. &EMP. L. 615,616
(1998) (discussing interconnection between workplace roles and other aspects of employees'
lives).
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out of the police force.' 3 If Title VII cannot forbid that invitation and defend the
officers who spumed it, then antidiscrimination law misses an opportunity to promote
the spontaneous, rank-and-file embrace of Title VII values. Without such protection,
employees can be expected to take the path of least resistance and acquiesce in
discriminatory workplaces, indeed to develop an investment in them.
More disheartening still is the suggestion that as a matter ofantidiscrimination law
itself men and women, whites and blacks, are inevitably locked in antagonistic
relationships in which discrimination against blacks and women necessarily
advantages whites and men. This is not the message the courts should be sending to
American workers. On such a reading, Title VII cannot seek either to overcome the
practices and institutions that offer advantage through discrimination or to promote
and protect alternative visions of race and gender relations. Instead,
antidiscrimination law resigns itself to managing inevitable intergroup conflict while
symbolically endorsing its rationality (for some). Title VII would be no more than a
prayer for a fragile truce, not an engine of race and gender peace.
This Article argues that Title VII jurisprudence should aspire to a richer vision of
equality by protecting and promoting intergroup relationships against the grain of
power. Although the various Childress courts ranged from uncomprehending at best
to hostile at worst, other courts have laid the foundation for understanding, and
vindicating, the claims of the Childress plaintiffs and others like them. Nonetheless,
even proplaintiff decisions rarely have been grounded in a coherent theory of Title
VII discrimination, generating weak opinions easily distinguishable or rejected by
courts seeking contrary outcomes. 4
In particular, courts have failed to conceptualize how men's gender and whites'
race could be implicated in interactions with members of other groups. Instead, they
have turned to expansive standing rules, antiretaliationprotections, special doctrines
of interracial association, or vagueprotections against "discriminatoryenvironments."
Each approach seeks to ground plaintiffs' claims in someone else's race and/or
gender.'5
13. Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 938 (E.D. Va. 1995), claims
dismissed by 919 F. Supp. 216 (E.D. Va. 1996), vacated and remanded by 120 F.3d 476 (4th
Cir. 1997) (panel opinion), panel opinion vacated and judgment below aff'd en banc by 134
F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
14. Cf Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2479, 2481 (1994) (criticizing a similar pattern among cases brought by "complex female
subjects" characterized either by "intersectionality" of race and gender or ambivalence about
categorization).
15. Commentators have uniformly followed this lead, disagreeing about whether and how
to provide Title VII protection but always assuming that the plaintiff's own race and/or sex was
not at issue. See Robert J. Aalberts & Lome H. Seidman, Should Prudential Standing
Requirements Be Applied in Transferred Impact Sexual Harassment Cases? An Analysis of
Childress v. City of Richmond, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 261,265-81 (1999); Mary-Alice Brady, White
Males Have Standing to Bring Hostile Environment Claims for Discrimination Directed
Towards Black andFemale Coworkers: Childress v. City of Richmond, 39 B.C. L. REV. 423,
423-32 (1998); Joseph C. Feldman, Standing and Delivering on Title Vii's Promises: White
Employees'Ability to Sue Employersfor Discrimination Against Nonwhites, 25 N.Y.U. REv.
2002]
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This pattern reflects first a, tendency not to see behaviors associated with being
white or male as racially or sexually specific in character, the oft-discussed process
by which white women are rendered simply "women," black men simply "black," and
white men simply "human.' 6 Secondly, the focus on discrimination against a third
party neglects how race and gender operate through processes of social interaction,
and instead casts race and gender as static attributes of individuals. 7 Finally, the
elision of plaintiffs' sex or race reflects difficulty conceptualizing how relations
within a single racial or sexual group may themselves have a racial or gendered
character (for instance, how men can have different relationships to masculinity)."S
L. & SOC. CHANGE 569, 580-602 (1999); David B. Hawley, "Standing" Up for Minority
Coworkers? White Males Do Not Have "Aggrieved Person "StandingforHostileEnvironment
Actions Under Childress v. City of Richmond, 77 N.C. L. REV. 865 (1999); Laura M. Jordan,
The Empathetic, White Male: An Aggrieved Person Under Title VII?, 55 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 135 (1999); Christopher M. O'Connor, Stop Harassing Her or We'llBoth Sue:
Bystander Injury Sexual Harassment, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501, 526-30 (1999); Judith
Resnick, The Rights ofRemedies: Collective Accountings for and InsuringAgainst the Harms
ofSexualHarassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUALHARASSMENT LAW (Catharine A. MacKinnon
& Reva Siegel eds., forthcoming); N. Morrison Torrey, Indirect Discrimination Under Title
VII: Expanding Male Standing to Sue for Injuries Received as a Result of Employer
Discrimination Against Females, 64 WASH. L. REv. 365,378 (1989); Recent Cases, Childress
v. City of Richmond, 112 HARV. L. REV. 725, 730 (1999).
16. See Abrams, supra note 14, at 2491-92 (noting that although all subjects are
"complex," socially privileged aspects of identity often are not seen as producing any
specificity); Matsuda, supra note 10, at 1375 (noting the racial and class specificity of
supposedly "American" accents); Proudford, supra note 12, at 634. See generally Combahee
River Collective, A Black Feminist Statement, in ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE
BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF Us ARE BRAVE, (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982); Kimberle
Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It Anyway?: Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations ofAnita Hill,
in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991).
17. See Candace West & Sarah Fenstermaker, Doing Difference, 9 GENDER & SOC'Y 8,
25 (1995) ("Conceiving ofrace and gender as ongoing accomplishments means we must locate
their emergence in social situations, rather than within the individual or some vaguely defined
set of role expectations."); Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, I GENDER
& SOC'Y 125, 126 (1987) ("Rather than as a property ofindividuals, we conceive of gender as
an emergent feature of social situations: both as an outcome of and arationale for various social
arrangements and as a means of legitimating one of the most fundamental divisions of
society.").
18. See Free to Be Me, in RACE TRAITOR I (Noel Ignatiev & John Garvey eds., 1996)
(recounting harassment of white teenagers by white classmates for "acting black"); Abrams,
supra note 14, at 2506-07 (discussing intrablack discrimination); Katherine M. Franke, The
Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U.
PENN. L. REv. 1,95 (1995) ("Title VII should be understood to encompass sex discrimination
suits by men against men when the plaintiffs have resisted participation or indoctrination in
[Vol. 77:63
BEYOND THE ZERO-SUM GAME
To develop a sound approach to cases like Childress, the Article proceeds as
follows. In Part I, I discuss how discrimination is mediated by innumerable, and
often subtle, acts of cooperation among coworkers. This intragroup solidarity among
workers who dominate the workplace may be enforced through sanctions against
members who break ranks to engage in intergroup solidarity. Although Title VII
always .has been interpreted to encourage private initiative that prevents
discrimination, courts' narrow conception of discrimination has stymied Title VII
protection for voluntary intergroup solidarity. What I call a "zero-sum game" model
posits workplace competition between distinct, opposing groups, rendering
nonsensical any simultaneous discrimination against members of more than one
"opposed" group: if there is discrimination against women then there can be no
discrimination against men.
Despite this conceptual roadblock, some courts have sympathized with plaintiffs
aiming to advance intergroup solidarity; the Title VII theories they developed are the
subject of Part I. One approach grants plaintiffs standing to sue for injuries caused
by discrimination against a third party. Another method broadly construes Title VII's
antiretaliation provisions to protect employees who refuse to discriminate. Finally,
a long but narrow line of decisions construes sanctions for an employee's interracial
association as discrimination based on that employee's race. ach approach shares
a hesitation to conceptualize hostility to intergroup solidarity as simultaneously (a)
based on the race or sex of the employee sanctioned and (b) integrally related to
practices of discrimination against another group.
Part IV responds directly to the challenge from Childress by interpreting sanctions
for intergroup solidarity as discriminatory enforcement of race or sex stereotypes.
Drawing on precedents prohibiting discrimination against subsets of race or sex
groups, I reconceptualize the theory of protected intergroup association as simply a
special case of the prohibition on race and gender stereotyping. Stereotypes may
include expectations that members of one race or sex group will engage in particular
forms of intergroup behavior. Modes of interaction across group lines are part of
what it means to be a man or to be white. When the mandated intergroup interaction
is discriminatory, intragroup enforcement of such stereotypes enhances rather than
contradicts discrimination against another race or sex group.
Of course, that sanctions for intergroup solidarity may constitute actionable
discrimination is an entirely separate matter from establishing discrimination in any
particular case. Part V explores the proof of race- or sex-based causation in
intergroup relations, as well as the special evidentiary and conceptual challenges in
identifying when actions directed against third parties, particularly members of other
groups, contribute to a racially or sexually discriminatory work environment.
II. INTERGROUP SOLIDARITY AND THE DYNAMICS OF DISCRIMINATION
Title VI's central mission is to dismantle race- and sex-based barriers to full
compulsory masculinity."); Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at
1774 ("[T]he most prevalent form of harassment experienced by men may be harassment
directed at them by their male coworkers or supervisors in an attempt to force conformity to
the dominant group's image of suitable masculinity for particular jobs.").
2002]
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participation in the American workplace. These barriers are erected and sustained not
only by formal policies of discrimination but by countless and cumulative acts of
individual discretion. Just as discrimination may arise out of or be bolstered by
ordinary workers' day-to-daybehavior, so too must antidiscrimination efforts tap into
ordinary workers' efforts to construct a fair workplace. It makes all the difference
whether an employee is welcomed into informal networks of learning and mutual
support or frozen out to languish in a hostile environment. Title VII should protect
workers in dominant workplace groups who resist discrimination and strive to foster
an atmosphere in which loyalty to their employers and coworkers doesn't mean
excluding or marginalizing others; such workers not only vindicate the statute's
substantive goals but also implement its policy favoring voluntary, private efforts to
prevent and remedy discrimination.
Attempts to claim this protection, however, have foundered on courts'
conceptualization of both the race and gender dynamics within dominant groups and
those at work when a common cause is made across race and gender lines. Standing
in the way is what I label the "zero-sum game" model of race and gender relations,
in which internally cohesive groups compete against one another for workplace
spoils. This view leaves no place for intergroup cooperation that sparks intragroup
conflict.
A. The Interdependence of Out-Group Exclusion and In-Group Cohesion
Between the two extremes of bureaucratically entrenched policies of
discrimination 9 and discriminatory application of personal workplace power"0 lies a
vast terrain of discriminatory practices woven into the social relations of work.
Whether women and racial minorities experience discrimination often depends on
whether the discriminatory tendencies of a few supervisors or coworkers are
amplified or counteracted by other members of the workplace. But if coworkers
themselves face sanctions for rejecting discriminatory practices, then their
commitment and ability to prevent such discrimination will be seriously taxed.
Unprotected by the law, David Childress and others like him may think twice before
again reaching across race and gender lines in the spirit of equality.
1. Coworker Cooperation in the Course of Discrimination
Intragroup relations frequently form the basis of intergroup discrimination. In any
number of cases, employees have complained that their supervisors directed them to
engage in or assist in discriminatory acts. In Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc.,2" for
19. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33, 436 (1971)
(hiring/promotion into favored job categories relied on racially discriminatory educational
requirements and tests); Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 191-92 (1991)
(company policy of excluding women of child-bearing age from certain jobs).
20. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60-61, 66-67 (1986)
(manager's campaign of harassment conducted primarily against one employee and largely out
of public view).
21. 138 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1998).
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instance, an account executive at an employee placement agency rewarded a white
worker with flowers and candy for placing only white applicants with his clients.'
Employees may also be punished for not discriminating, such as the harassment
Pamela Chandler, a white manager, encountered when her restaurant's owners began
thwarting her attempts to hire and promote African-Americans.'
In addition to discrete employment decisions 'and explicit advocacy of
discrimination, studies of workplace dynamics have uncovered far more subtle ways
in which exclusionary practices are embedded in workers' everyday relationships.
Rosabeth Moss Kanter's classic Men and Women of the Corporation24 details how
the informal sociability among male managers marks women as outsiders, closes them
off from important information and decisionmaking, and deprives them of informal
acts of workplace solidarity crucial to job success:
They missed out on important informal training by peers. There were
instances in which women trainees did not get direct criticism in time to
improve their performance and did not know they were the subjects of
criticism in the company until told to find jobs in other divisions. They
were not part of the buddy network that uncovered such information
quickly, and their managers were reluctant to criticize a woman out of
uncertainty about how she would receive the information.25
22. Id. at 1180. In Scott v. Marsh, No. Civ.A.3:89-3059, 1994 WL 797678, at*l (D.S.C.
Apr. 15, 1994), affd mem. 43 F.3d 1468 (4th Cir. 1994), a white, Grace Scott, was asked to
be an office informer on the activities of her black coworkers, and in Lyman v. Nabil's, 903 F.
Supp. 1443, 1445 (D. Kan. 1995), a restaurant owner required a male manager to implement
discriminatory transfers of women employees,. See also Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669
F.2d 1179, 1180-81 (7th Cir. 1982) (blackmale employee sanctioned forrefusing to participate
in scheme of discrimination against white women); Spillman v. Carter, 918 F. Supp. 336,339
(D. Kan. 1996) (white employee sanctioned forrefusing to participate in raciallydiscriminatory
hiring).
23. Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (E.D. Ark. 1994); see also
EEOC v. St. Anne's Hosp. of Chicago, Inc., 664 F.2d 128, 130 (7th Cir. 1981) (white woman
fired after hiring African-American).
24. ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977).
25. Id. at 227; see also C.J. Chivers, For Black Officers, Diversity Has Its Limits, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2,2001, at Al (detailing the failure of the New York City Police Department to
recruit and promote black men). Similar dynamics are also critical in blue-collarjobs in which
relevant skills are attained largely through on-the-job training. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing
Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 1751; Kristen R. Yount, Ladies, Flirts, and Tomboys:
Strategies for Managing Sexual Harassment in an Underground Coal Mine, 19 J. CONTEMP.
ETHNOGRAPHY 396, 405, 410 (1991). Moreover, the camaraderie and mutual commitment
holding together such networks may be essential to worker safety when the willingness of
coworkers to put themselves at risk is critical to avoiding and defusing workplace hazards. See
Rose Melendez: Police Officer, in HARD-HATTED WOMEN: STORIES OF STRUGGLE AND
SUCCESS INTHETRAADES 71,78 (MollyMartin ed., 1988) [hereinafter HARD-HATTED WOMEN];
Charles Vaught & David L. Smith, Incorporation and Mechanical Solidarityin an Underground
Coal Mine, 7 Soc. OF WORK & OCCUPATIONS 159, 160-61 (1980); Yount, supra at 405.
2002]
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Because reliance on such informal networks is structured into the workplace and its
job expectations, there is no clear distinction between failing to provide assistance to
coworkers and actively undermining their ability to work successfully.
Far more overt forms of-exclusion are also mediated by the social relations of
work. Structuring workplace conversations around topics designed to exclude or
humiliate outsiders may both directly communicate unwelcomeness and erect a
barrier to the social integration important to job success.26 Kanter observes that in the
presence of "token" women, male managers exaggerated their use of sexual
innuendo, story-telling premised on male protagonists, and portrayals of women as
objects of sexual attention incompatible with active professional roles;27 "by raising
the issue and forcing the woman to choose not to participate, the men in the group
created an occasion for uniting against the outsider and asserting dominant group
solidarity."2 Even more aggressive forms of harassment include group taunting,
shunning,29 work sabotage, or physical attacks.30
The collective character of these practices is often critical to their discriminatory
effects. A worker requiring training, honest criticism, or an opportunity to test new
skills may not need it from all her coworkers but from only a small fraction of them.
Only when coworkers systematically fail to provide such support will work
competence be undermined.3 A similar dynamic attends the recurrent problem of
white men's refusal to accept the workplace authority of women or people of color.
Although isolated defiance is problematic enough, the stakes in disciplining an
individual worker are much different than in overcoming a collective work
stoppage.32 Even when threats to work competence originate with isolated individuals,
Indeed, one ofthe Childress plaintiffs' primary complaints was that the fracturing ofworkplace
solidarity would lead to officers hesitating to provide backup in the dangerous situations
routine to police work. Brief for Appellants at 13, Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp.
934 (E.D. Va. 1995) (No. 96-1585).
26. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 1197 (describing how workplace practices that are not
"explicitly combative" nonetheless render "women perpetually off balance, unclear about
whether they will be regarded as serious workers and uncertain what 'rules of the game' apply
to them in a particular setting").
27. See KANTER, supra note 24, at 222-24; see also Nancy DiTomaso, Sexuality in the
Workplace: Discrimination and Harassment in THE SEXUALITY OF ORGANIZATION 71, 80-81
(JeffHeam et al. eds., 1989) (noting how men's workplace displays ofsexualityaround women
were more exaggerated than outside the workplace).
28. KANTER, supra note 24, at 224.
29. See Rose Melendez: Police Officer, in HARD-HATTED WOMEN, supra note 25, at 73
("None of the men would talk to me. That was the worst.").
30. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 1752-53.
3 1. Of course, there may also be situations in which individual workers hold a monopoly
over.a relevant resource and may individually impose such harms.
32. See JONES, supra note 8, at 302, 346. Moreover, when such resistance is uniform, it
is much more likely that the problem will appear to lie with the supervisor's ability to wield
authority than with the subordinates' refusal to accept it. Thus, women and minorities in such
positions may be forced to adopt supervisory styles that appear inappropriately weak,
excessively harsh, or just plain ineffective. See EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN., U.S.
[Vol. 77:63
BEYOND THE ZERO-SUM GAME
their worst consequences may be avoided if coworkers intervene to stop physical
attacks or verbal ridicule, to warn targets of harassment about particular threats, or
to complain to supervisors about discriminatory behavior. Thus, even the "aberrant"
behavior of individuals may be facilitated by widespread passive acquiescence.
The symbolic dimensions of exclusionary activity are especially reliant on
collective behavior. Harassment, including subtle forms ofsocial exclusion, mayhave
the effect of posting a "men only" or "whites only" sign in the workplace. 3 But the
impact of this message is a function of workplace uniformity. A world of difference
separates a workplace in which one worker obviously objects to your presence while
nine others welcome you and a workplace in which all turn their backs and leave
when you enter the room.
These, then, were the stakes in Childress. Would Lieutenant Carroll's racism and
sexism define the workplace environment or would he stick out as a reviled
aberration, vulnerable to his subordinates' united front?
2. Cooperation and Coercion
Some workers may willingly, even eagerly, participate or acquiesce in
discriminatory practices founded on intragroup workplace cooperation. Nonetheless,
many others, all other things being equal, would reject participation in discriminatory
DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN TRADITIONALLY MALE JOBS: THE EXPERIENCES OF TEN PUBLIC
UTILITY COMPAmES, 62-66 (R & D Monograph 1978); see also Abrams, supra note 8, at 1219
(describing how men "are masculinized by exerting control over whether and when women act
as self-determining agents"); Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at
1722; cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (sex discrimination case turning
on evaluations of a woman's managerial style as excessively harsh and aggressive).
33. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1498 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (stating that a "men only" sign in workplace contributed to hostile environment);
Proudford, supra note 12, at 631 (comparing subtle exclusionary dynamics to a door marked
"Whites Only') (quoting Naomi Wolf, The Racism of Well-Meaning White People, GLAMOUR,
Aug. 1985, at 230).
34. Incumbent workers may (a) stand to benefit economically from reducing competition
for their jobs, see BARBARA F. RESKIN & PATRICIA A. Roos, JOB QUEUES, GENDER QUEUES:
EXPLAINING WOMEN'S INROADS INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS 310 (1991); Assar Lindbeck &
Dennis J. Snower, Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment, 78 AM. ECON.
Rnv. 167, 167-69 (1988); (b) prize a work identity integrated with other forms of group
membership thatwould be undermined by inclusion, see Cohen, supra note 11, at 248; Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8; (c) believe inclusion incompatible with
the proper social role of another racial and/or sexual group, see NANCY FoLBRE, WHO PAYS
FOR THE KIDs?: GENDER AND THE STRUCTURES OF CONSTRAINT 6 (1994); JONES, supra note
8, at 318; or (d) they simply perform the discriminatory activity on other grounds and be
indifferent or oblivious to its adverse impacts on others. Courts and commentators have also
emphasized the possibility for discriminatory treatment to occur through unselfconscious bias
in evaluations and other employment decisions. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (acknowledging problem of "subconscious stereotypes and prejudices");
Lawrence, supra note 9; Krieger, supra note 9.
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practices and act affirmatively to disrupt them, given the increasingly widespread
moral opposition to discrimination even among groups that have historically
benefitted from it," the principled and economic interests in fair workplaces, 6 and
a simple decency towards mistreated individuals. Less dramatic, but still important,
are ordinary workplace interactions across race and sex lines that tend to neutralize
the subtle discrimination perpetrated by isolation. All these actions that undermine
discrimination maybe understood as intergroup solidarity, from initiating grievances
over discrimination, chastising coworkers for racist or sexist remarks, supporting a
colleague subjected to discrimination, recognizing the value of a professional
contribution, offering honest criticism, accepting another's exercise of workplace
authority, or avoiding patronizing "protection" from risky but rewarding tasks, to
forming social ties across group bounddaies.
But all other things are not equal; instead, workers' solidaristic acts may run the
risk of provoking the same gamut of sanctions that impose intergroup discrimination
itself. As Childress and his coworkers discovered, the actions employees should take
as a matter of course in a nondiscriminatory world can themselves be met with
firings, lost promotions, adverse performance evaluations, reduced responsibilities,
threats, insults, isolation, and so on.37 Similarly, inaction may provoke reprisals, as
when violation of an "expectation that a man will accept and participate in jokes and
comments about women [leads to] questioning his masculinity by calling him a
'pussy' or a 'fag."'' 8
35. See, e.g., ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL (1998). Abstract opposition to
discrimination, however, may be coupled with skepticism that discrimination is a significant
phenomenon. See James R. Kluegel, "If There Isn 't a Problem, You Don 't Need a Solution,"
28 AM. BEHAV. SC. 761, 775-79 (1985) (discussing interaction between white explanations
of African-American disadvantage and support for affirmative action); Krieger, supra note 9,
at 1186-1217 (distinguishing between discrimination originating in motivational desire to
inflict disadvantage and cognitive bias in evaluation).
36. See PAULA ENGLAND, COMPARABLE WORTH: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 56-68 (1992)
(reviewing neoclassical theories of employment discrimination that predict that
nondiscriminating employers have a competitive advantage over discriminators); Samuel
Bowles, The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and
Marxian Models, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 16, 20, 28 (1985) (employees have an interest in
overcoming divisions in order to counter employer surveillance); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier,
The Future ofAffirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953,1022-
34 (1996) (arguing that because diversity makes workplaces more productive and race and
gender discrimination signal other workplace failures, economic productivity aligns with norms
of fairness and democracy in favoring vigorous antidiscrimination practices).
37. See also Kingsley Clarke, Running the Ball in Crown Point, in RACE TRAITOR 39
(Noel Ignatiev & John Garvey eds., 1996) (describing backlash against white high school
football player who quit team in protest of coach's racist remark); Selwyn Raab, Whistle-
Blowing Marshal Tells of Long Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at 39 (describing
harassment of white U.S. Marshal who spoke out against white coworkers' racism).
38. Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., But Was It Really Sexual Harassment: Legal, Behavioral,
and Psychological Definitions of the Workplace Victimization of Women, in SEXUAL
HARAssMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 5,24 (William O'Donohue ed., 1997).
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When a group asserts its control over social territory like a workplace, it should be
no surprise to see coercion brought to bear both on outsiders seeking entry and on
putative insiders who would open the borders. 9 In one case we have interlopers and
invaders, in the other traitors and deserters. The situations are by no means
symmetrical (an insider may have a luxury of choice unavailable to the outsider), but
they remain fundamentally connected. David Childress could have avoided serious
harassment by remaining silent, but once he and his black and female coworkers
spoke out together, they found themselves in the same boat.
3. Beyond the Coworker Relationship
Inter- and intragroup relations in the workplace may enforce and maintain
inequality with respect to more than just employment. This is so because workplaces
are not solely places of work. Employees interact with customers, clients, patients,
and many others. As a result, workplaces may be sites not only for employment
discrimination but for discrimination in housing, health care, education, delivery of
government services, and so on. Employees are thus in a position to engage in forms
39. A framework of simple insiders and outsiders is oversimplified, of course, and
multiple forms of identity may be in play simultaneously. Membership in one group, for
instance, may raise doubts as to a person's loyalty to another, triggering more stringent
scrutiny. Women entering male-dominated occupations have often been subjected to such
loyalty tests, including ones in which they face intense pressure to establish solidarity on other
grounds such as race or to disclaim allegiance to other women. See KANTER, supra note 24, at
227-29; Vicki Smith: Sprinkler Fitter, in HARD-HATrED WOMEN, supra note 25, at 143. A
simple insider/outsider model is also inadequate because relations across group lines may
implicate not stark exclusion but other aspects of inequality. Employment discrimination
against women and people of color, after all, has been as much about segregation into
dangerous, subordinate, and/or servile work as refusal of employment altogether. See JONES,
supra note 8 (describing historical shifts in what have been considered "white" and "black"
jobs); RESKiU &ROOS, supra note 34, at 3-21 (describing occupational segregation by sex and
race). The two, of course, are closely related because exclusion from higher status and more
attractive jobs has the effect of "crowding" victims of discrimination into worse jobs and,
moreover, further worsening thosejobs by reducing workers' bargaining power through threat
of exit for better work. See, e.g., HEIDi I. HARTMANN& BARBARAF. RESKIN, WOMEN'S WORK,
MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATIONONTHEJOB 9-17 (1986). Discriminatoryworkplace practices
thus may include exercises in subordination, trivialization, petty control, or humiliation across
occupational categories between which there is little question of worker mobility. See JONES,
supra note 8, at 328-29, 336 (describing niche of"black"jobs organized around catering to the
needs of wealthy whites and beliefs that black men were particularly well-suited to hot, dirty
work); Peggy Crull, Searchingfor the Causes ofSexual Harassment: An Examination of Two
Prototypes, in HIDDENASPEcTs OFWOMEN'S WORK 225,235 (Christine Bose et al. eds., 1987)
(discussing harassment of women in traditionally female jobs); Nancy DiTomaso, Sexuality in
the Workplace: Discrimination and Harassment, in THE SEXUALITY OFORGANIZATION 71, 82
(JeffHeam et al. eds., 1989) (describing a boss who "'wanted to look at a younger woman' so
his 'spirits could be lifted"'); Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at
1767-68 (discussing harassment of women in traditionally female jobs).
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of intergroup solidarity that undermine or prevent a variety of types of
discrimination." Such assertions of solidarity, even when they involve nonworkers
or persons with a different employer, may nonetheless subject an employee to
workplace sanctions brought on by, for instance, reporting fellow police officers'
discriminatory use of force,4' serving customers or clients shunned by fellow workers,
or objecting to discriminatory processing of housing applications.
Furthermore, workplace sanctions may be prompted by actions taken outside the
scope of employment. Employees do not relate to one another solely on the basis of
their lives at work; leisure activities, family relationships and history, religious and
community involvements, neighborhood controversies, and so on all form the basis
of workplace conversations, friendships, and suspicions that profoundly influence
interactions as workers.42 Coworkers may care intensely about such extraworkplace
behaviors and respond to them in ways that determine success or failure, acceptance
or exclusion, at work. David DeMatteis, for instance, was a white worker at a Kodak
plant in Rochester who was hounded from his job for selling his home in an all-white
neighborhood to an African-American family.43 Some men have faced harassment at
work for taking on domestic responsibilities that coworkers expected to be assumed
by wives," and workers have been fired or otherwise sanctioned for interracial
friendships and marriages.45
40. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991) (criticizing absence of prohibition on sex
discrimination in consumer contracting); Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the
Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARv. L. REv. 517 (1993) (criticizing absence of legal
remedies for harassment of women in public spaces).
41. See David Barstow & Kevin Flynn, Officer Who Broke the Code of Silence Defies
Labels, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1999, at B I; Michael Cooper, New Plan to Protect Police
Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1998, at B4; see also Proudford, supra note 12, at 616.
42. See KANTER, supra note 24, at 48-59 (describing importance of social similarity to
workplace trust).
43. See DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1975).
44. See Jennifer L. Berdahl et al., The SexualHarassment ofMen?, 20 PsYCH. OFWOMEN
Q. 527, 540 (1996); see also Tamar Lewin, Father Awarded $375,000 in a Parental Leave
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1999, at A9 (describing a supervisor who refused male employee
family leave on the grounds that "unless your wife is in a coma or dead, you can't be the
primary care provider").
45. See infra notes 221-26. The actions that provoke such workplace penalties may not
directly implicate legal questions of discrimination but touch upon racial and/or gender
relations that contribute to broad patterns of inequality. Cf. supra note 42. Moreover, inequality
seemingly "outside" work may contribute to employment inequality but remain beyond the
reach of legal regimes focused on employer/employee relations. See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 37-42, 117-18 (1996) (arguing that discrimination in
housing, lending, and education reduces employment opportunities in minority communities);
Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the
Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89 (1993) (arguing that gender inequality in the division ofdomestic
responsibility limits women's access to employment); see also Lewin, supra note 44.
[Vol. 77:63
BEYOND THE ZERO-SUM GAME
B. Combating Discrimination Through Voluntary Action
"Although Title VII seeks 'to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account
of unlawful employment discrimination,' its 'primary objective,' like that of any
statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid
harm."46 Rank-and-file employees are frequentlyin a position to fulfill this preventive
purpose through the gamut of workplace solidarity. Such initiative can discourage
tangible adverse employment actions and counter harassment before it becomes
severe or pervasive.47
1. Antidiscrimination from the Bottom Up
How can such voluntary action be encouraged? In one approach, employers have
implemented training programs and managerial techniques designed to attack the
"subjective and interpersonal elements" that elude even the most aggressive
institutional efforts at preventing discrimination and that pervade smaller or less
committed enterprises.48 Whatever their promise, such "sensitivity" programs face
criticism for costliness and time-consumption, as well as the ham-handedness that can
come with "formal, overt attempts to alleviate prejudice that is, by its very nature,
informal and covert."'49
An important complement to such top-down approaches is the removal of barriers
within organizations that discourage employees already inclined toward positive
change. Indeed, the stories in reported cases and research on discrimination in
organizations suggest that there are many American workers who, even under current
conditions, are willing to risk their jobs to do the right thing. At the very least, we
should develop legal strategies that protect such workers and that affirm the place of
small acts of everyday decency or outright courage in the broader national struggle
for racial and gender equality. More ambitiously and optimistically, such public
affirmation and legal protection might itself spur the kinds of intergroup solidarity,
great and small, that are indispensable to a robust culture of equalitybut are deterred
by well-placed fear of reprisal. 0 On this view, organizational change is not just a
46. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998) (quoting Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,417-18 (1975)) (citations omitted). Preventive action is a
worthy goal given the sunk costs of even successful litigation, courts' limited remedial
capacities, hesitation by potential plaintiffs to resort to litigation, see Kristin Bumiller, Victims
in the Shadow ofthe Law: A Critique of the Model ofLegal Protection, 12 SIGNS: J. OF WOM.
IN CULTURE & Soc. 421 .(1986), cost barriers to litigating meritorious suits with modest
damages, and deep difficulties of proof.
47. Cf Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,764 (1998) (reasoning that appropriate
employer liability standards "could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before
it becomes severe or pervasive" and thereby "serve Title VII's deterrent purpose").
48. See Pettigrew & Martin, supra note 9, at 45-46.
49. Id. at 70; see also Proudford, supra note 12, at 616, 634 n.56 (discussing employee
dissatisfaction with diversity training).




question of enlightened employers educating their recalcitrant workers but one of
promoting and protecting ordinary workers' sense of fairness.5
2. The Place of Private Antidiscrimination Efforts in Title VII Doctrine
Title VII's preventative aspirations have always guided its interpretation, and the
courts have consistently construed the statute so as to promote and protect private
initiative that serves its broad remedial purposes. Indeed, the House of
Representatives' report accompanying the 1964 Civil Rights Act, in a passage the
Supreme Court has found particularly significant, sets out the goal that "[flederal
legislation dealing with the most troublesome problems will create an atmosphere
conducive to voluntary or local resolution ofotherforms of discrimination.""2 Title
VII can be deployed to stimulate "voluntary, private ... efforts to abolish traditional
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy"' 3 either as a sword or as a shield.' The
It is our faith.., that the majority of so-called whites in this country are neither
deeply nor consciously committed to white supremacy, like most human beings
in most times and places, they would do the right thing if it were convenient ....
[M]ost go along with a system that disturbs them, because the consequences of
challenging it are terrifying.
Id. See also Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy ofthe Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1379, 1434-39 (1993) (discussing how the
symbolic congressional endorsement of collective bargaining stimulated labor activism).
51. None of this is an argument against employer-initiated programs, only a call that the
same voluntary spirit also be nurtured in the grassroots initiative of employees. To the extent
this can be done by removing existing disincentives, some of the drawbacks of bureaucratic,
formal interventions in the microdynamics of work may be avoided, especially when
managerial commitment to organizational change is lacking. Although protections for
intergroup solidarity complement organizational efforts at its active promotion, both still share
the fundamental limitation of any focus on microlevel interaction: the inability to attack how
organizational structure itself leads to problematic intergroup relations. See KANTER, supra
note 24, at 208-42 (analyzing experiences of token women); Pettigrew & Martin, supra note
9, at 70; see also Sturm, supra note 9, at 646-50 (describing informal decisionmaking and
decentralized work teams as workplace structures that generate discrimination). Although
highly structural analyses like Kanter's provide a clear exposition of how numerical imbalance
between groups may set in motion organizational dynamics harmful to "tokens" or "out-
' groups," they can rarely provide a full explanation either of why particular characteristics form
the basis for group differentiation or of the particular forms the intergroup dynamics take. For
this reason, it would be a mistake to draw the completely pessimistic conclusion that
microrelations are entirely driven by numerical distribution or that interventions in
microrelations can never induce structural change.
52. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2393) (emphasis in
original).
53. Id.
54. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616,642 (1987)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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shield currently limits the liability of defendant employers who implement bona fide
affirmative action and employee harassment policies,55 while the sword already
imposes liability under abroad reading of the statute's antiretaliation provisions56 and
when objects of harassment take preventive or corrective steps to no avail. 7
From the perspective of employees considering solidaristic acts, or reconsidering
them after warnings or reprisals from coworkers, the broader availability of Title
VII's sword could shield them from the negative consequences of such solidarity,
whether through actual recourse to the courts or through employers' protection of
threatened workers in order to avoid liability.58 Offering such protection to workers
reflects "basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action
by objecting employees," '59 not only in the narrow context of post hoc objections to
accomplished acts of employment discrimination but in those broader circumstances
where "the value of voluntary efforts to further the antidiscrimination purposes of
Title V1"' includes "'resolution of other forms of discrimination."' '6'
C. Doctrinal Barriers to a Title VII Claim: Childress and the Zero-Sum Game
From this policy perspective, Childress looks like an easy case. In Childress, Lt.
Arthur Carroll, a white, male supervisor in a traditionally and still-segregated
occupation,6' began a campaign of harassment against women police officers,
55. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 542 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragherv. City ofBocaRaton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998); Weber, 443 U.S. 193; Johnson, 480 U.S. 616.
56. See Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1138 (5th Cir.
Unit A Sept. 1981) (grounding interpretation of retaliation provisions in "'Title VII's central
purpose, the elimination of employment discrimination by informal means' (quoting Berg v.
La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1980))).
57. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07.
58. See Sturm, supra note 9, at 654-55 (discussing preventive sexual harassment policies
as an example of interplay between standards of liability and changes in management
practices).
59. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 745.
60. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 650.
61. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,204 (1979) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963)) (emphasis omitted).
62. See, e.g., Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 929-30 (4th Cir. 1981)
(describing consent decree settling previous race discrimination charges against the Richmond
police department); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation, 105 YALE L.. 1, 85-94 (1995) (discussing historical exclusion of women from
policing). Although the record is not clear, it appears that the police unit at issue contained at
least sixteen officers and no more than three women. Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F.
Supp. 934, 938 (E.D. Va. 1995) (noting supervisor's reference to three women officers as "all
my bitches" and that sixteen officers complained about Carroll), claims dismissed by 919 F.
Supp. 216 (E.D. Va. 1996), vacated and remanded by 120 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997) (panel




especially the lone African-American.63 In addition to harassing the women officers
in theirpresence,' in their absence Carroll expressed racial and gender solidarity with
white, male officers, solidarity premised on contempt for and exclusion of white and
black women. By making known to white, male officers his racially and sexually
hostile attitude towards the worthiness of a black, female coworker and openly
cherishing an all-white, all-male roll call as "like it used to be,"65 Carroll's remarks
were not simply designed to drive out the women; they also offered to the white men,
as white men, an affirmation of their race and gender-based claim to workplace
dominance. Rather than joining Carroll in the harassing behavior or passively
tolerating it, the men joined the women officers in complaining to Carroll's
supervisor about. the workplace environment, specifically defending their ideal of
cross-race, cross-sex teamwork against the divisiveness Carroll fostered.66 In
response, they were harassed, threatened, and adversely transferred and evaluated.67
When Childress and other officers sought relief under Title VII, however, the men's
claims of discrimination were dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state
a claim,6" though the same allegations were deemed sufficient for two women's
gender discrimination claims to survive both dismissal and summary judgment.69
Judge Williams's reasoning in support of dismissal and the subsequent reasoning
of both the appellate panel and en banc Fourth Circuit each illustrate the conceptual
barriers to understandinghowa single set ofemploymentpractices could discriminate
against members of different racial and sexual groups, especially against persons of
the same race or sex as those perpetrating the discrimination. From this perspective,
race and sex are fixed characteristics of individuals that define membership in stable
race and sex categories grounded in identifiable, immutable features of the body.
Moreover, these fixed characteristics have a digital quality that places persons in
clearly defined groups: one is either a man or a woman, white, black, Asian, or some
other racial class. Whatever differences there may be among, for instance, men, they
are not differences related to the basis of group membership itself; with regard to sex,
they are all simply men.
A corresponding view of race and gender discrimination is expressed by the core
rationale for dismissing Childress's claims, namely that Carroll's discrimination
against women and Aflican-Americans ° necessarily left the men alleging that Carroll
was "biased in their favor."' To reach this conclusion of gender favoritism from the
63. Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 937.
64. Id. at 938 (recounting Carroll's comments to three women that "[w]ell, I see all my
bitches are here, it must not be that time of the month" and references to female officers as his




68. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
69. Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 940. The race discrimination claims of two white, female
officers were also dismissed. Id. No claims were brought by any nonwhite officers. Id.
70. The court agreed that a claim for discrimination against the two women had been
stated. Id. at 939-40.
71. Id. at 939. Judge Williams repeatedly referred to discrimination against women and
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premise of gender discrimination against particular women, several analytical steps
are necessary, each relying on the model of sex and race outlined above.
First, discrimination against particular women implies a bias against women in
general. If discrimination focuses on the characteristic of gender, and gender is the
same thing for all women (indeed that sameness defines the group "women!"), then
women are interchangeable for the purposes of sex discrimination and there is no
reason that one would discriminate (based on sex) against one but not against others.
Second, discrimination against one group is always effectively discrimination in
favor of another,72 since members of one group lack the disadvantage associated with
membership in the other and thus are comparatively advantaged. Discrimination, then,
locks women and men into a zero-sum oppositional relationship in which sex
discrimination against women as a group implies sex favoritism towards men as a
group, whether as a goal or as a necessary side effect.73 In order to identify
discrimination then, one searches for this comparative disadvantage: "The critical
issue... is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."74
Finally, the relationship between men as a social group and any individual man is,
like that between particular women and women as a group, one of simple substitution:
what favors men favors any individual man because of his sex. Therefore, gender
discrimination against the female officers implies discrimination against women,
which implies favoritism towards men, which in turn implies favoritism towards the
male officers.75
African-Americans interchangeably with "special treatment," id. at 939, "better treatment," id.
at 940, and "favoritism," Childress, 919 F. Supp. at 219, for men and whites. Indeed, the court
found the claims so "spurious" that even the employer's retaliation against the employees for
filing charges with the EEOC, an action normally cloaked in "absolute privilege," would not
support a cause of action. Id. at 218-19.
72. As Clark Freshman has pointed out, a two-group model of discrimination may be
applicable even when-from one perspective-there are multiple groups present. See Clark
Freshman, Whatever Happened to "Anti-Semitism "?: How Social Science Theories Identify
Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between "Different"Minorities, 85 CoRNELLL. REv.
313 (2000) [hereinafter Freshman, WhateverHappened to "Anti-Semitism"?]. Thus, if whites
act on the basis of a white/nonwhite divide, there may be effectively two groups for the
purposes of understanding those whites' discrimination even if Latinos, African-Americans,
Asian-Americans, and Native Americans all face discrimination. Id.
73. See also Recent Cases, supra note 15, at 730 (criticizing the Childress courts for
"conceiv[ing] of race and gender relations as a zero-sum game in which a loss to one is a gain
to another").
74. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)). But cf infra text accompanying notes 277-80.
75. Similar reasoning underlies the court's other ground for dismissing the male officers'
sex discrimination claims: "Title VII addresses only discrimination between the sexes," a
conclusion based on the reasoning that same-sex interactions cannot amount to "discrimination
'because of the plaintiff's gender." Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 939. As Judge Williams
understood it, Title VII aims to protect "a class which is defined against, and protected with
respect to, the alleged discriminator." Id. The Supreme Court has since rejected this view. See
2002]
INDIANA L,4 WJOURNAL
From this zero-sum game perspective, an employment practice cannot
simultaneously discriminate against men and women or whites and blacks;
accordingly, once it is clear that a practice does discriminate against one race or sex
group, it follows that the practice cannot ground a claim of discrimination against a
non-overlapping race or sex group.76 Indeed, such a claim requires a perverse role
reversal, presenting oneself as discrimination's victim when in fact one is, as Judge
Williams objected, its beneficiary.
The Childress court's conceptual framework could nonetheless accommodate
injury to the white, male officers in spite of their race and sex, precluding only
discrimination because of their race and sex. Whatever their interest as white men,
it remained plausible that interests unrelated to race or sex meant that, on balance, the
Childress plaintiffs were injured in the course of the discrimination against women
and African-American officers. Although they were not discriminated against,
perhaps they suffered some other actionable injury. Like others before them, the
Childress courts explored the possibilities for redress through theories of third-party
standing to challenge discrimination against others and of retaliation for opposing
discrimination against others. It is to these and related theories that I now turn.
III. CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF TITLE VII PROTECTION FOR INTERGROUP
SOLIDARITY
Courts sympathetic to plaintiffs like the Richmond officers have allowed plaintiffs'
claims to go forward under Title VII theories of third-party standing, retaliation, and
discrimination based on interracial association. The doctrines suffer from sometimes
serious strains in reasoning and unintended consequences, and these weaknesses have
not only led other courts to restrict their reach, but have also provided a weak
foundation for more vigorous protection of intergroup solidarity. In each case the
limitations stem from failure to break cleanly with the zero-sum reasoning on display
in Childress and to recognize that an integral component of race and sex stereotypes
Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (rejecting the argument that same-sex harassment can never be actionable
discrimination).
76. Analogous reasoning is often found in opinions grappling with the figure ofthe "equal
opportunity harasser." Some courts have suggested that if both a man and a woman have
experienced workplace harassment, then neither of them could have been harassed because of
their sex. See, e.g., Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[A]n
environment which is equally harsh for both men and women... does not constitute a hostile
working environment under the civil rights statutes."); Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161
F.3d 263,270-71 (5th Cir. 1998); Pasqua v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir.
1996). Other courts, however, have rejected this argument and allowed women's harassment
claims to go forward, notwithstanding the fact that male coworkers (none of whom were
coplaintiffs) had also been harassed. See Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 242
(4th Cir. 2000); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256,260 (7th Cir. 1996); Steinerv. Showboat
Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d
246, 252-55 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing and rejecting the proposition that "there could be no
discrimination 'because of sex' where both a woman... and a man... were harassed," but
ruling against plaintiff on other grounds).
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may be the behavior expected towards other groups.
A. Third-Party Standing
Broad rules of standing allow whites and men to bring suit even when the zero-
sum model assumes they could not, have personally suffered race or sex
discrimination. This approach directly confronts the complaint that such plaintiffs
would recover "for violations of other people's civil rights" and embraces it."
Although appealing in some respects, broad standing yields an uneasy fit with the
protection of workers engaged in intergroup solidarity. It very broadly grants a right
of action to anyone injured by discrimination against others, regardless of whether
remedying his or her injury furthers Title VII's specific statutory purposes. On the
other hand, the standing approach narrowly requires the plaintiff to prove
employment discrimination against a third party, excluding workers injured in the
course of preventing discrimination or because of solidarity with nonemployees.
Title VII imposes on employers the duty not to discriminate in the "terms,
conditions, orprivileges" ofan individual's employmentbecause ofthatperson's race
or sex.79 The question of "standing" concerns which persons are entitled to enforce
that duty through litigation."0 Ordinarily, only the person to whom a legal duty is
owed-here, the employee discriminated against-may sue on its breach, not persons
"whose only injuries derive from the violation of others' rights."8" This principle,
known as a "prudential" limitation on standing, is a presumption of statutory
interpretation; Congress may freely override it,8" subject only to the less stringent
constitutional constraints on the jurisdiction of the federal courts.83 The "case or
controversy" requirement of Article M limits access to the federal courts to plaintiffs
who can show that they have suffered a concrete injury or "injury in fact," that this
injury was caused by the violation of a statutory duty, and that the injury will be
redressed by the remedy sought.'
77. Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 940.
78. See also Brady, supra note 15; Torrey, supra note 15.
79. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
80. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975) ("In essence the question of standing
is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues."); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 244
(1988).
81. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wa. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1278
(D.C. Cir. 1994); accord Gladstone, Realtors v. Viii. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979);
Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
82. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,372 (1982); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501
("Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by
prudential standing rules."); Fair Employment Council, 28 F.3d at 1278.
83. Havens, 455 U.S. at 372; Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; FairEmployment Council, 28 F.3d
at 1278.
84. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 372; Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 99-100; Fair Employment
Council, 28 F.3d at 1278; Fletcher, supra note 80, at 239-240. These prudential and
constitutional limits on invoking the federal judicial power ensure that the parties are truly
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If the prudential limitations apply to Title VII, then aperson like Childress maynot
sue under Title ViI's antidiscrimination sections unless his employer discriminated
against himbased on his race or sex. If, however, Congress intended to grant standing
to anyone meeting the lesser Article III requirements, then failure to allege
discrimination against oneself does not preclude a valid claim; instead, it is enough
to allege injury caused by discrimination against someone else.85 The question of
whether the statute permits third-party claims to go forward arises only after
concluding that the plaintiff does not have first-party standing as one claiming
discrimination because of her or his own race or sex.86
The Childress plaintiffs argued that Carroll's behavior disrupted teamwork on the
police force, with the consequence that plaintiffs were endangered by their inability
to rely on their coworkers for back-up when faced with dangerous situations.87 Judge
Williams concluded that such claims were illegitimate "attempt[s] to recover for
violations of other people's civil rights, which they have no standing to do."88 On
appeal, plaintiffs expressly claimed that "they were subjected by defendants to a
sexually... and to a racially hostile work environment" that violated "their civil
rights under Title VII."89 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
as amicus curiae, however, framed the case as turning on standing, not discrimination
against the officers. As the EEOC saw it, plaintiffs claimed that the Title VII
violation consisted of. the discriminatory racial and sexual harassment of their
coworkers, while plaintiffs' injury from an unsafe working environment gave them
standing to bring suit.9" The appellate panel adopted the EEOC's analysis:
The problem is standing. Even if we assume . . . that the City has
discriminated against its black and female officers in the "terms,
conditions, privileges" of their employment, we need to determine
whether the plaintiffs are "persons aggrieved" and, if so, whether they
adverse and that the courts do not get drawn into purely speculative disputes or into rehashing
legislative policy decisions. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498; Fletcher, supra note 80, at 222.
85. As the Supreme Court explained in the context of Title VIII housing discrimination,
"[t]he central issue at this stage of the proceedings is not who possesses the legal rights
protected . . . but whether respondents were genuinely injured by conduct that violates
someone's ... rights, and thus are entitled to seek redress of that harm." Gladstone, 441 U.S.
at 103 n.9 (emphasis in original).
86. See Fair Employment Council, 28 F.3d at 1277.
87. Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 938 (E.D. Va. 1995), claims
dismissed by 919 F. Supp. 216 (E.D. Va. 1996), vacated and remanded by 120 F.3d 476 (4th
Cir. 1997) (panel opinion), panel opinion vacated and judgment below affd en bane by 134
F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); see also Brief for Appellants at 18, Childress (No. 96-
1585).
88. Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 940.
89. Brief for Appellants at 1, Childress (No. 96-1585) (emphasis added).
90. Brief ofAmicus Curiae EEOC at 2, 9, Childress (No. 96-1585). The EEOC took no
position on plaintiffs' claim that the hostility of the environment to themselves constituted a
Title VII violation. See id. at 2 & n.I.
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have suffered an injury that would entitle them to bring this action.9
For the panel, the question was not whether plaintiffs' Title VII rights had been
violated but whether Title VII allows suits by persons alleging a loss of teamwork due
to discrimination against coworkers.
The threshold issue thus became whether Congress's use of the phrase "person
claiming to be aggrieved"92 granted standing to any person meeting Article III
requirements or instead incorporated the more stringent "prudentiar' bar on third-
party claims.93 Relying on a line of cases in which white plaintiffs have been given
standing to challenge discrimination directed against people of color, the panel
adopted the former interpretation and remanded for the district court to determine
whether the loss of teamwork for the white male officers met the Article III injury
requirements.94 The full Fourth Circuit subsequently vacated the panel opinion, and
the en banc court, though evenly divided as to the outcome, continued to frame the
issue as whether "the complaining officers ... have standing under Title VII to bring
an action for discrimination directed at others." '95
91. Childress, 120 F.3d at 480 (emphasis in original).
92.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(f)(l) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
93. The appellate opinions in Childress assumed a rather stark choice between the
prudential and Article III standards. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decisions on third-party
standing in housing discrimination actions have also relied on just this dichotomy by
contrasting prudential standing limited to first parties with third-party standing as broad as
Article III permits. See Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 375-76 (1982);
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979); Trafficante v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). Congress, however, could grant standing to a class
broader than so-called first parties but narrower than simply any injured third party regardless
of the nature of the injury. "Essentially, the standing question in such [prudential] cases is
whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be
understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief." Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). Congress can thus grant standing selectively among those
"positions" involving constitutionally sufficient injury. In the context of judicial review of
administrative decisions, for instance, the Court has adopted prudential principles granting
standing to persons within the "zone of interests" of the statute at issue. See generally Clarke
v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 394-400 (1987) (discussing the zone ofinterests test);
Fletcher, supra note 80, at 255-64. In such circumstances the injury suffered by the plaintiff
does not itself constitute the alleged statutory violation (usually the claim is that a regulation
or administrative determination is inconsistent with the authorizing statute) and thus is not a
true "first-party" plaintiff; yet the "zone of interests" test allows suit by such "third-party"
plaintiffs when protection of their injured interests is related to the regulatory purposes of the
statute in question. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399. The "zone of interests" concept, however, does
not appear in the Court's decisions on standing to sue for violations of individual rights.
94. Childress, 120 F.3d at 480-81 & n.8.
95. Childress, 134 F.3d 1205,1207 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (per curiam). A concurrence
rejected the white male plaintiffs' claims as "assert[ing] only the rights of third-parties to be
free from race- or sex-based discrimination in the workplace." Id. at 1209 (Luttig, J.,
concurring).
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For my purposes, the important part of the Childress appeal is not the deadlock
within the Fourth Circuit over how to interpret "persons aggrieved." Instead, it is the
agreement, shared with the EEOC, that the injuries plaintiffs alleged could not
themselves constitute Title VII violations but were strictly collateral effects of
discrimination against others.96 Neither opinion even considered whether the alleged
injury might itself have been based on plaintiffs' race or sex.97
More generally, the standing cases are shaped by a tension between lowering the
standing threshold and tying the injury to the discriminatory harms made actionable
by Congress. A court granting a plaintiff standing can move in either of two
directions: toward expanding the range of injuries that may support standing by
moving from the prudential bar on third-party claims to the broad Article III standard,
or toward construing the alleged injury as discrimination itself. Courts considering
allegations of injury from practices that discriminate against members of groups other
than plaintiff's own-generally whites bringing claims based on race discrimination
against minorities and men bringing claims based on sex discrimination against
women-have increasingly tied the plaintiffs alleged injury to the harms of
discrimination. While this approach has narrowed the class of injuries that support
standing, it has also pushed courts closer to considering how plaintiffs' own race or
sex may be implicated in discrimination against others.
1. Trafficante and the Ambivalence Between Statutory Interests
and Third-Party Standing
The standing approach originates in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.,98 in which one black and one white tenant of a housing complex brought suit
against its owner for a practice of discriminating against black rental applicants."
Plaintiffs claimed that they lost the benefits of living in an interracial conmunity, lost
business opportunities from the absence ofminority tenants, and were stigmatized for
96. Commentators on Childress and other standing cases have uniformly shared this view.
See, e.g., Recent Cases, supra note 15, at 729 ("[T]he plaintiffs were not claiming they
themselves were discriminated against ...."); Torrey, supra note 15, at 397 ("The guilty
employer in a discriminatory work environment case does not discriminate against white
plaintiffs directly-the focus of discrimination is against minorities."); see also supra note 16.
97. Judge Luttig's concurrence claimed, for instance, that "[t]he white male plaintiffs have
not alleged that they were discriminated against because of their race or sex," Childress, 134
F.3d at 1207 n.2 (emphasis added), because the fact that Carroll's remarks were made to the
white men both in and out of the black and female officers' presence precluded the plaintiffs
having been "singled out because of their race or sex." Id. Like Judge Williams, Judge Luttig
appears to have assumed that a discriminatory employment practice must single out one or
another race or sex group and cannot discriminate against members of more than one group
simultaneously. See supra Part II.C. In its opinion, the panel also assumed that no Title VII
violation inhered in the conditions of plaintiffs' employment, as is apparent by its conclusion
that same-sex harassment cases were irrelevant to Childress. See Childress, 120 F.3d at 480
n.4.
98. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
99. Id. at 205.
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residence in a "white ghetto."'' The Supreme Court found that Congress intended a
right of action for any person who suffered injury in fact from prohibited
discrimination, that is, "to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article lln."''
The Court concluded that the requisite "injury to existing tenants by exclusion of
minority persons from the apartment complex is the loss of important benefits from
interracial associations."'' 2
Later courts have emphasized Trafficante's discussion of interracial associations,
supported by legislative history showing that Congress believed housing
discrimination harmed both those excluded and those within the exclusive
community.'0 3 This focus on the particular injury in question is puzzling because
Article Ill standing requires only a certain magnitude of injury and causal connection
to the substantive violation,"°' and thus whether Congress was specifically concerned
with injury from loss of interracial association should not have been analytically
important once the Article III standard was adopted.' By moving to a standing
formulation, the Court gave a cause of action to "all in the same housing unit who are
injured by racial discriminatiod in the management of those facilities within the
coverage of the statute."'" Nonetheless, the Court intimated that it was especially
concerned with a form of racial injury, namely the deprivation of interracial
associations.' 7 The turn to Article III standing, however, avoided the need to
articulate that injury as discrimination.
2. The Haphazard Development of a Right to a Nondiscriminatory
Work Environment
Courts drawing on Trafficante for Title VII purposes have reflected this
ambivalence between broad Article III standing and standing based on a specific
interest in interracial associations. Courts of appeals have consistently relied on
Trafficante to confer standing on white plaintiffs raising race discrimination claims
based on actions against nonwhite employees, but their decisions show an important
100. Id. at 208. Notably, the black and white tenants claimed the same injuries, that is, the
black tenant did not claim to have been discrimfinated against in the rental of his or her own
apartment.
101. Id. at 209 (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d. Cir.
1971)). Hackett had already offered the same interpretation of Title VII.
102. Id. at 209-10.
103. Id. at 210-11.
104. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79-80 (1978);
Fletcher, supra note 80, at 230-31,258-60 (describing and criticizing established doctrine that
"injury in fact" is a purely factual question independent of the substantive content ofthe statute
in question). Also, the interracial association argument only addresses the white tenant's
claims, not the black tenant's injury from denial of intraracial association.
105. Cf Fair Employment Council v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(holding that advocacy organization has standing under Article III to challenge discrimination
discovered by "testers").
106. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212.
107. Id. at 210.
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evolution in the theories of injury in fact.
In Waters v. Heublein, a white woman claimed she had suffered sex
discrimination in pay and promotions and that black employees had suffered similar
race discrimination." The court discussed Trafficante at length, concluding that its
arguments for an Article III standing standard applied to Title VII and that
"interpersonal contacts-between members of the same or different races-are no
less a part of the work environment than of the home environment."" The court,
however, implicitly extended the theory of injury in fact beyond loss of interracial
association because the discriminatory practices the plaintiff alleged did not affect the
racial (or sexual) composition of the workplace, only the distribution of pay and
authority within it."'
Cases following Waters, however, drew on the developing law of workplace
harassment to fill this gap in the theory of how white workers could be injured by
discrimination against African-Americans. Tentatively in EEOC v. Bailey Co."12 and
robustly in EEOC v. Mississippi College,"' courts reasoned that all persons,
regardless of race, had a right to "work in an environment unaffected by racial
discrimination.""' Bailey and Mississippi College both relied on the Fifth Circuit's
seminal hostile-environment decision in Rogers v. EEOC"5 to buttress plaintiffs'
claims to a cognizable injury in fact under Trafficante's rule of broad Article Im
standing, but the courts did not construe these environments as themselves creating
actionable discrimination against the white plaintiffs.
A further shift from third-party standing toward injuries that violate the statute
108. 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976).
109. Id. at 467.
110. Id. at 469.
11I. Similarly, in Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982), a white assistant
principal sued to enjoin use of a screening test that had a disparate impact on African-
Americans in the selection of principals after she had been denied an appointment based on the
same test. The Seventh Circuit relied on Trafficante both for its application of the Article III
standard and for its identification of the relevant injury as harm to interracial association. Id.
at 850; see also EEOC v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Freight, Inc., 659 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1981) (granting
standing to white employees injured by discriminatory seniority system). Although the obvious
injury in fact, clearly traceable to the racially discriminatory practice, was the direct harm to
plaintiff's employment prospects from use of the test in question, the court again turned to the
"loss of important benefits from interracial associations," Stewart, 675 F.2d at 849, even
though it acknowledged Stewart had failed to allege such injury and even though the possibility
that the discriminatory test had affected Stewart's work environment was highly speculative.
Id. at 850.
112. 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977).
113. 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
114. Id. at 483; see also Bailey, 563 F.2d at 454 ("[Ihe EEOC has interpreted Title VII
to confer upon every employee the right to a working environment free from unlawful
employment discrimination."); Recent Cases, supra note 15, at 730; Torrey, supra note 15, at
378; Note, Work Environment Injury Under Title VII, 82 YALE L.J. 1695 (1973); Resnick,
supra note 15.
115. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
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itself came in Clayton v. White Hall School District."6 In Clayton, a white school
employee moved out of the catchment area for schoolchildren, but the school allowed
her child to continue to attend the school." 7 When a black employee outside the area
attempted to enroll his child in the school as well, the school began to enforce its
residency requirement against both children." 8 The white employee sued the school,
alleging that it had discriminated against the black employee in the granting of a
privilege of employment and that this discrimination had created a racially
discriminatory environment. 9 The Eighth Circuit first found that Clayton had third-
party standing to sue because she appropriately alleged "an injury in fact," identified
as deprivation of a "work environment free of racial discrimination."'20 The court
ignored the obvious direct injury-the racially motivated denial of the privilege of
enrolling one's child in the school-in favor of a theory of injury from "the lost
benefits of associating with persons of other racial groups."'' The interracial
association theory was particularly tenuous here because the practice in question
affected neither the racial composition of the workforce nor any employee's
workplace duties.
The Clayton court's analysis of the claim's merits further elided the distinction
between a third-party standing claim (based on injury in fact from an environment
infected with employment discrimination against others) and a substantive "first-
party" Title VII right of all employees, including whites, to an environment "free of
racial discrimination."'" Although Clayton had standing, the court found that her
claim failed on its merits because the single change in enrollment policy could not
have established an environment sufficiently offensive to violate Title VH. If,
however, the discriminatory environment had merely established standing to
challenge the discriminatory decision to refuse the black employee a tangible
privilege of employment (allowing nonresident enrollment of employees' children),
then the merits of the Title VII claim should have turned on whether the school had
discriminated against her black coworker, not on the hostility of the environment to
the plaintiff.
3. The Retreat from Third-Party Standing in the Context of Sex Discrimination
The emphasis on specific concern for interracial association over Article III
standing based on any "distinct and palpable injury"'24 has led to dramatically
116. 875 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1989).
117. The school had a policy allowing such exceptions for children of teaching and




120. Id. at 680.
121. Id. at 679.
122. Id. at 680.
123. Id.
124. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
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curtailed standing in some cases alleging sex rather than race discrimination.'"
Although in Waters the Ninth Circuit had pioneered the extension of Trafficante's
standing rationale to Title VII, the same court sharply limited the theory in two cases
considering "comparable worth" challenges to the pay scale in female-dominatedjob
categories.
In Spaulding v. University of Washington"6 members of the University of
Washington nursing faculty, including one man, charged that the university
discriminated against them in pay because the faculty was predominantly female.'
The court summarily rejected the man's claim that his own salary was "infected" by
the discrimination against women faculty.' 8 This argument presented a classic claim
for third-party Article III standing: plaintiff suffered a distinct, personal harm (lower
pay) because of discrimination against someone else (female faculty). Indeed, despite
differences in sex, both male and female nursing faculty suffered the same injury: the
same reduced pay scale. Yet the same court that in Waters had granted standing to a
white plaintiff who complained of pay discrimination against African-American
coworkers based on the far less direct injury to interracial associations, never even
addressed the question of third-party standing in Spaulding. Subsequently, in Patee
v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 9 the Ninth Circuit confronted the seeming
conflict between Waters and Spaulding, and it distinguished the interracial standing
cases as resting on the "harmful impact on the plaintiffbecause of the denial of
association with members of other groups,"'30 whereas in Patee "most of [plaintiff's]
coworkers are women."' The court never considered whether injuries other than loss
of association (like lost pay) could provide third-party standing.
In another comparable worth case, Judge Weinstein relied on Patee to repudiate
the third-party standing paradigm, declaring, "[t]he law requires that the person
125. Indeed, the Waters, Bailey, and Mississippi College courts all expressly reserved
judgment as to whether their reasoning extended beyond race discrimination suits. EEOC v.
Miss. College, 626 F.2d 477,483 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439,454
n.9 (6th Cir. 1977); Waters v. Heublein, 547 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1976). The Supreme
Court, however, has consistently applied the same standards to analysis of race and sex
discrimination under Title VII. E.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S.
616 (1987). But see Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Should Prudential Standing
Requirements Be Applied in Transferred Impact Sexual Harassment Cases? An Analysis of
Childress v. City of Richmond, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 261 (1999) (arguing that Title VII should
provide third-party standing in race discrimination cases but not in sex discrimination cases).
126. 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984).
127. Id. at691-96.
128. Id. at 709.
129. 803 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1986). In Patee, the duties of predominantly male Test Desk
Technicians were transferred to predominantly female Maintenance Administrators, who were
paid 20% less. Id. at 476-77. Male and female Maintenance Administrators brought suit
claiming that their pay was depressed because of sex discrimination in pay scales. Id. at 476.
130. Id. at 478.
131. Id. at 479. The district court in AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 664 F. Supp. 64
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) followed Patee's reasoning in a similar comparable worth claim by men in
a predominantly female job category.
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claiming discrimination be discriminated against." ' This apparent truism, however,
is precisely what Trafficante rejected; instead, the Court granted standing to anyone
genuinely injured by discrimination, including discrimination against others.'33
4. Conclusion
Surveying the standing cases, we can see that Trafficante really points in two
directions: toward a clear rule of Article I standing in which the injury grounding
standing need have no relationship to particular statutory purposes so long as it has
a causal relationship to an act of discrimination, and toward an as-yet unarticulated
theory whereby the effects of discriminatory practices on intergroup
relationships-both their very existence and their form-may themselves constitute
actionable discrimination against those who at first seem like bystanders. " Although
generous third-party standing maypermit some plaintiffs to prevail, it fails to advance
the conceptual and political project of linking plaintiffs' interests in intergroup
relations to Title VII's core commitments to race and gender equality. Indeed,
132. Siegel v. Bd. ofEduc., 713 F. Supp. 54, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Spaulding, 740
F.2d at 709 (rejecting male plaintiff's claims as "bootstrapping" and dismissing them with the
observation that "[he] makes no claim that he received a lower wage because of his sex.").
133. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,212 (1972). The alternative, third-
party standing path is clearly marked in Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 79-80
(3d Cir. 2000), where male "extras" alleged that the employer ceased to assign work to extras
when the next person on the priority list was a woman. This practice prevented the
accumulation of seniority and reduced available work both to all women extras and to those
men below the first woman on the priority list. Id. Applying Article III standing principles, the
court concluded that the men had standing because they "pled specific facts to demonstrate a
concrete injury as well as a nexus between the alleged injury and the sex-based discrimination,
even though that discrimination was aimed in the first instance at others, we conclude that they
have established standing." Id. at 92. TheAnjelino court specifically declined to rest its analysis
on any associational loss, relying instead on the injuries from reduced hiring and loss of
seniority. Id.; see also Pa. Nurses Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, No. 86-1586, 1991 WL 120200
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1988) (granting standing to male employees opposing discriminatorily low
pay in predominantly female job category); Allen v. Am. Home Foods, 644 F. Supp. 1553
(N.D. Ind. 1986) (holding that male plaintiffs had standing where their employer shut down
their plant because it had a predominantly female work force).
134. Cf Franke, supra note 18, at 97 (criticizing view of men as "merely observers, not
victims, of sexually discriminatory policies that assume a hypermasculine point of view or
standard of performance"). Indeed, the very formulation of asking whether a plaintiff asserts
"his own legal interests, rather than those of third parties," Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979), merely begs the question whether Congress has
determined that injury to a given interest confers standing to sue. Once a given injury is
remediable byrecourse to litigation, the partywho sues to remedy that injury obviously asserts
"his own interest." See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 92 n.26 (suggesting that where men and women
suffer the same economic harm from discrimination aimed at women, the men's injuries are no
more "indirecet" than the women's); Fair Employment Council v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d
1268, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Fletcher, supra note 80, at 246.
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because a strict Article HI approach requires only a causal connection to
discrimination, it allows opportunistic invocations of the statute, against which courts
traditionally defend with maxims decrying third-party standing.'35
The other tendency, away from broad Article III standing and toward specific
recognition of interests in intergroup association or freedom from work in a non-
discriminatory environment, is also problematic. To the extent'that injury to these
interests would itself give plaintiffs a cause of action, the theory threatens to become
untethered from Title VII's language, which requires a showing that an employer
discriminated against an individual because of his or her own race or sex. Clayton's
conclusion that Title VII confers a "right to work in an atmosphere free of
discrimination and to enjoy the myriad benefits of associating with members of other
racial or ethnic groups,"'36 would make the Title VII violation, not just standing to
sue, turn on "emotional or psychological injury to the plaintiff herself"" without
showing either that this injury occurred because of plaintiff's race or sex or that some
other employee was discriminated against because of race or sex.' Additionally, the
analogy to residential integration breaks down in situations, such as comparable
worth claims, in which the discrimination at issue goes not to persons' presence or
absence within the workplace butto forms of discrimination specific to more complex
workplace institutions, such as questions of pay, authority, and promotion.
Both approaches allow plaintiffs into court without articulating how a single
practice might discriminate against members of groups on different sides of
subordinating social relations. Broad standing separates injury from discrimination,
permitting a wide class of injured plaintiffs to sue, but only when employment
135. The white plaintiff in Clayton v. White Hall SchoolDistrict, 778 F.2d 457 (8th Cir.
1985), is particularly unsympathetic, because she suffered from nothing more than the school's
decision to enforce its own matriculation rules. If anything, she initially may have been the
beneficiary of an exception to rules meant in part to prevent black children from enrolling, to
the extent that the line determining which employees' children could enroll-the line between
teaching and administrative personnel and service and maintenance personnel-mapped onto
occupational segregation in the school.
136. Id. at 459; accord EEOC v. Miss. College, 626 F.2d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 1980)
("Summers may charge a violation of her own personal right to work in an environment
unaffected by racial discrimination.").
137. Clayton, 778 F.2d at 459.
138. See also Resnick, supra note 15 (supporting a right not to work in workplace where
harassment occurs); Recent Cases, supra note 15, at 730 (arguing for a Title VII right to a
"nondiscriminatory environment" distinct from athird-party standing claim). To the extent the
"nondiscriminatory environment" theory means to emphasize that certain injuries, even when
not imposed because of a person's race or sex, are particularly significant under Title VII, the
textually and doctrinally sound method of incorporating this claim is through a standing
analysis analogous to the "zone of interests" concept in administrative law. See supra note 93.
Such an approach would grant standing to plaintiffs whose injuries were not themselves
statutory violations (that is, not imposed because of race or sex) but whose injuries were
nonetheless among those that Title VII specifically aims to prevent and remedy. This approach,
however, is irrelevant if Title VII already grants standing to the full extent allowed by Article
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discrimination can be proven against someone else. A specific focus on interracial
association merges injury with the cause of action, but it threatens to lose any
connection with discrimination and to reach only a narrow class of injury. Both
approaches, moreover, allow litigation by entirely passive plaintiffs injured by past
discrimination without protecting proactive workers who prevent or disrupt
discrimination.
B. Retaliation
Title Vii's antiretaliation provisions provide an obvious doctrinal basis for
protecting intergroup solidarity and have been used to that end widely and
successfully. Employees who have explicitly opposed others' discriminatory
practices, refused orders to commit discriminatory acts, or even merely acted'in
nondiscriminatory ways have all brought successful claims.
Title VII not only protects employees from discrimination in employment because
of race and sex but also makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee because
she has "opposed any practice" forbidden by Title VI." 9 The elements of a
retaliation claim are "(1) statutorily protected expression, (2) an adverse employment
action, and (3) a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse
action."' 40 Opposition to discrimination is protected regardless of whether the
discrimination at issue is directed at the person subjected to retaliation or at another
person.' 4' A finding of retaliation, then, carries no implication that the victim was the
subject to race or sex discrimination.'42
A retaliation approach shifts the basis of the substantive violation to the plaintiff's
experience and explicitly recognizes the assertion of intergroup solidarity. As with
the standing approach, however, a retaliation theory must identify race- or sex-based
employment discrimination against a third party'43 and thus can reach intergroup
solidarity only with coworkers, not nonemployees. Even then, serious difficulties
attend defining the scope of worker behavior protected against workplace retaliation.
139.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Nor may employers retaliate against
employees who have "assisted, or participated in any manner" in an EEOC investigation. Id.
140. Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1136 (5th Cir. Unit
A Sept. 1981) (quoting Smalley v. City of Eatonville, 640 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1981));
accord Drake v. 3M, 134 F.3d 878, 885 (7th Cir. 1998).
141. See, e.g., Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 597 F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir.
1979) (rejecting the proposition that a valid retaliation claim requires an allegation "that there
were racial or sexual overtones in the action taken against [the person subjected to retaliatory
action]"); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev'd on
other grounds, 519 U.S. 337 (1997); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d
1235, 1256 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds by 422 U.S. 366 (1979).
142. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996).
143. Unlike the standing cases, however, the plaintiff need not prove that the employer
actually discriminated, only that the plaintiff reasonably believed that it had done so. Payne,
654 F.2d at 1137.
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1. Locating the Opposed Discrimination
One important question of the retaliation theory's scope is its ability to reach
retaliation for preventive action, rather than only post hoc criticism. For instance,
Connie Spillman, an assistant manager at a Taco Bell, was ordered by the district
manager not to hire, and indeed to fire, any minority (or disabled) workers.'" When
Spillman refused to comply, the manager first verbally abused her and then refused
to speak to her, when Spillman formally complained, her immediate supervisor told
her that she would find a way to fire Spillman if she pursued her complaints, resulting
in a constructive discharge.'"I The district court found that Spillman stated a claim for
retaliation because ofher opposition to "raciallydiscriminatory acts of defendants,"'"
but never identified those acts with particularity. It seems unlikely that employees
targeted by Spillman's supervisor would have had any claim if Spillman had simply
ignored her supervisor's instructions. In such a scenario it would be difficult to
establish that the targeted employees, that is, those Spillman was asked to
discriminate against, actually suffered any discrimination in the "terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment."'47
Implicit in Spillman, then, is the notion that Title VII's protection against
retaliation for opposition to "any practice made an unlawful employment practice""'
can be read broadly to encompass any practice that would be unlawful if carried out
Thus, an employee retaliated against for simply going on record opposing
employment discrimination would be protected. No court has gone that far, but in a
case in which a black employee objected to a scheme to discriminate against a white
employee, Judge Posner wrote for the Seventh Circuit:
[Plaintiff's] prompt and vigorous opposition averted unlawful
discrimination; and we think an a fortiori violation of section 2000e-3(a)
is committed when an employee opposes an attempt to discriminate
against a fellow employee so successfully that the employer desists from
the attempt and then fires the "whistle blower" for what he had done."'
This preventive theory is straightforward and compelling in circumstances like
those in Spillman and Rucker where an employer has proposed but not implemented
a discriminatory practice and an employee engages in opposition. The opposed
unlawful employment practice becomes more elusive, however, when the plaintiff is
sanctioned for hiring women or people of color, absent either any prior employer
requests to discriminate or plaintiff's articulated opposition to such discrimination.
Such a case arose in EEOC v. St. Anne's Hospital, where Barbara Herzon, a white,
Jewish woman who headed St. Anne's Hospital's security department, hired a black
man as a customer service representative, the first African-American in the
144. Spillman v. Carter, 918 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D. Kan. 1996).
145. Id. at 339, 342.
146. Id. at 342.
147.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
148.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
149. Rucker v. Higher Educs. Aids. Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1982).
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department. Later that day, individuals claiming membership in the American Nazi
Party began calling the hospital to announce their intention to eliminate blacks and
Jews, making bomb threats against the hospital, and threatening "to fix that bitch
Barbara, head of security, who hired that black assistant."' Several fires were also
set at the hospital that afternoon. '5 Astonishingly, the hospital responded by asking
Herzon to resign because she had offended those making the threats.' Herzon
charged that she was discriminated against as a woman and a Jew, but the EEOC
brought suit on the theory that the hospital had retaliated for Herzon's opposition to
racially discriminatory hiring practices.'
The hospital claimed that it could not have engaged in retaliation because the
EEOC did not identify any unlawful employmentpractice to which Herzon registered
opposition." The Seventh Circuit rejected this "narrow interpretation," reasoning
that had Herzon not hired the black man, she would have committed employment
discrimination because, as she did hire him, he presumably was the "most qualified
applicant."'55 Because an employee who protested this hypothetical discrimination
would be protected against retaliation, the panel found it "equally clear" that Herzon
must be protected as well.' 6 The differences, however, between the hypothetical and
actual facts are precisely two crucial elements of an ordinary retaliation claim: the
presence of an unlawful employment practice (the failure to hire) and an act in
opposition to it (the protest). The court seems simply to have reasoned backwards
from the reprehensible character of the employer's behavior:
Surely, it would impede voluntary compliance with Title VII, a primary
aim of section 704, if employees in decision-making positions who hired
minority applicants had to fear losing their own jobs because of the racial
bias of others. Section 704(a) was specifically designed to encourage
employees to act to protect Title VII rights, and that is what Herzon has
assertedly done.
5 7
Although the court's intuition is undoubtedly right, its analysis remains clumsy.
Particularly striking is the focus on the hiring of the first black employee 58 to the
exclusion of evidence of sexism and anti-Semitism, and, in particular, evidence that
150. Id. at 129-30.
151. Id. at 130.
152. Id. Herzon also alleged that she was told that the hospital thought a man could
provide better security. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 132.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 133; see also Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1138, 1144 (E.D. Ark.
1994) ("[A]n employee who exercises her authorityto promote and employAfrican-Americans
engages in protected 'opposition' to her employer's unlawful employment practice which seeks
to deprive African-Americans of such benefits.").
158. St. Anne's Hosp., 664 F.2d at 132 n.4.
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the caller saw opposition to "blacks and Jews" as of a single piece.'59 Herzon
evidently failed to fit the caller's vision of what kind of person should run the
hospital security department-a white man who would preserve the staff s
whiteness- a vision in which the hospital itself acquiesced. Herzon's actions toward
black job applicants-not discriminating against them-further confirmed that
deviation.
A step toward articulating the discriminatory character of some retaliatory actions
was taken by Moyo v. Gomez,'" in which the Ninth Circuit considered the section
704(a) claims of a black corrections officer who alleged retaliation "for protesting
against and refusing to cooperate with defendants' practice ofallowing showers after
work shifts to white inmates but not to black inmates working the same job shift."''
Avoiding the question of whether opposition to discrimination against nonemployee
inmates could support a Title VII retaliation claim, the court held that Moyo stated
a claim based on his opposition to "the unlawful employment practice inherent in
requiring Moyo to discriminate against blacks as a term or condition of [Moyo's]
employment."' 62 On this reasoning, requiring discrimination against others may also
constitute discrimination against the employee subject to the requirement.63
Moyo leaves open whether its approach relies on the plaintiff being the same race
as those against whom he was required to discriminate. Nearly this exact issue was
raised in Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Department,'" a case concerning a white
police officer trainee allegedly "given poor evaluations and eventually terminated for
having reported" and protested officers' discriminatory comments toward and
unjustified arrests of black and Hispanic civilians.'65 The court concluded that the
plaintiff stated no Title VII retaliation claim because discrimination against
nonemployees is not an "unlawful employment practice.'" The court briefly
considered the Moyo theory but dismissed it on the facts because the plaintiff
introduced no evidence that "minority employees of the Department felt that they
worked in a racially hostile environment."'' Thus, the Wimmer court acknowledged
that white employees' discrimination toward minority nonemployees could cause a
hostile environment for minority employees (opponents of which would be protected
from retaliation). However, the Wimmer court failed to consider whether such
discrimination could have racial significance for other white employees. While
159. See generally Freshman, Whatever Happened to "Anti-Semitism," supra note 72;
Clark Freshman, Beyond Atomized Discrimination: Use of Acts of Discrimination Against
"Other" Minorities to Prove Discriminatory Motivation Under Federal Employment Law, 43
STAN. L. REv. 241 (1990) [hereinafter Freshman, Beyond Atomized Discrimination].
160. 40 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1994).
161. Id. at 984.
162. Id. at 985.
163. Indeed, Moyo goes on to instruct the district court to allow amendment of the
complaint to claim that the requirement created a racially discriminatory hostile work
environment. Id. at 986.
164. 176 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1999).
165. Id. at 134-35.
166. Id. at 135.
167. Id. at 136.
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conscious ofthe racial connectionbetween victims of discrimination and others of the
same race, the court overlooked the possibility of a racial connection between
perpetrators of discrimination and others of the same race.6 '
2. Identifying Acts of Opposition
Cases like St. Anne's Hospital also raise the problem of identifying the employee
acts that are to be treated as opposition to discrimination. Clearly, explicit verbal
criticism of discrimination qualifies, and, under Spillman and Rucker, so too does
refusal to carry out discriminatory instructions. 69 But difficult problems remain with
more subtle acts. Sometimes, as in St. Anne's Hospital, the plaintiff may not know in
advance that the employer requires discrimination and may trigger retaliation by
performing nondiscriminatory acts, not by refusing to perform discriminatory ones.
The idea of "opposition" seems to require a prior unlawful practice, whether
proposed or carried out, against which one reacts, but St. Anne's Hospital suggests
a much broader notion encompassing any action merely inconsistent with
discrimination.
McDonnell v. Cisneros,7 o another Seventh Circuit case, takes a half step in this
direction, granting section 704(a) protection to a male supervisor who alleged a
retaliatory transfer for failing to suppress his female subordinate's complaints of
168. Id. See also Sidari v. Orleans County, 174 F.R.D. 275, 283 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(dismissing a white corrections officer's attempt to enjoin a prison's racial discrimination
against black inmates on the theory that it created a hostile work environment that
discriminated against him personally).
169. See discussion supra Part HLI.B. 1. Some authorities, however, suggest that employee
action that disrupts discriminatory practices by refusing to accept managerial authority is not
protected against retaliation. See Smith v. Tex. Dep't of Water Res., 818 F.2d 363, 366 (5th
Cir. 1987) (rejecting retaliation claim in which plaintiff refused to perform secretarial duties
outside her job description, and reasoning that 'an employer remains entitled to loyalty and
cooperativeness from employees' and that refusing the assignment was unreasonable because
"[i]t had no immediate adverse effect on her salary or other terms of employment") (quoting
Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230 (1 st Cir. 1976));
see also Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting an employer prerogative "to
preserve a workplace environment that is governed by rules, subject to a chain of command,
free of commotion, and conducive to the work of the enterprise"). But see Austin v. Ford
Models, Inc., 149 F.3d 148, 155 (2d Cir. 1998) ("If indeed Ford denied Austin overtime pay
because of her race and denied Austin equal staffing assistance because of her race and age,
then it would plainly be discrimination for Ford to fire Austin for refusing to work unpaid
overtime hours without an assistant."); Portav. Rollins Envtl. Servs., 654 F. Supp. 1275, 1284
(D.N.J. 1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988) (permitting retaliation claim by employee
who refused an order to work the same shift as an alleged sexual harasser); Slack v. Havens,
7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885, 887 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 1973) (allowing discrimination
claim by plaintiffs who were fired for refusing to accept a discriminatory task assignment),
modified and aff'd, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
170. 84 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996).
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discrimination.'" Chief Judge Posner recognized that while situations like Rucker
"are cases of active opposition," theMcDonnellplaintiff's "'opposition' was passive.
It consisted only of failing to carry out his employer's desire that he prevent his
subordinates from filing discrimination complaints."'' Nonetheless, reasoning that
"[p]assive resistance is a time-honored form of opposition," the court found it within
Title VII's concept of "opposition."'" The opinion does not make clear what role
"the employer's desire" plays in this analysis. 4 Would plaintiff's "fail[ure] to carry
out" this desire constitute "passive resistance" whether or not he was aware of the
desire?"5 Must this desire even have existed at the time ofthe "resistance" rather than
emerging only in retrospect? 76
Even if, as St. Anne's Hospitalreasoned, employee actions, or inactions, constitute
"opposition" when any other act would itself violate Title VII, it is difficult to stretch
"opposition" to encompass more subtle behaviors that stand in less stark contrast to
actionable discrimination. In Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.'n
Larry and Rosalie Drake filed retaliation claims against their employer, 3M. The
"record [was] replete with evidence that some of the employees at 3M's plant were
racial bigots,"'7 and the Drakes alleged that their coworkers had harassed them in
retaliation for the Drakes' friendship with two black coworkers; for Mr. Drake's aid
to them navigating union grievance, pay, and overtime procedures; and for his
criticism of plant racism in a local newspaper. 8 ' The Seventh Circuit, however,
concluded that onlyMr. Drake's printed comments "can be characterized as protected
expression''" and went on to say that "we do not believe that the spiritual guidance
and friendship that [Mrs. Drake] provided ... constitutes protected activity."'"
Indeed, expanding Title Vii's retaliation provisions to cover such behavior would
be to stretch the concept of"oppos[ition to] ... unlawful employment practice[s]"' m
to the breaking point, far removed from the paradigm of direct, self-conscious
confrontation with an employer's illegal action. There is strong reason, however, to
think that seemingly insignificant microbehaviors like providing the interpersonal
support and friendship common among coworkers, teaching new workers the rules
of the workplace, accepting the authority of supervisors, and so on may be at least as
important to preventing hostile work environments as explicit statements of





176. See Clarke, supra note 37, at 40 (noting that student had not self-consciously placed
himself in opposition to racist teammates but that his position as someone differentiated by
opposition to racism arose only in the aftermath of others' hostile reaction).
177. 134 F.3d 878, 885 (7th Cir. 1998).
178. Id. at 885.
179. Id. at 881.
180. Id. at 881-82.
181. Id. at 885.
182. Id. at 886.
183. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a).
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opposition to discrimination.'
C. Intergroup Association
In a narrow class of cases the courts have recognized injuries based on a worker's
relationship to persons of another race as injuries caused by that worker's own race.
When employers sanction white workers for interracial marriage or other intimate
relationships, courts forthrightly label the behavior race discrimination against the
sanctioned employee, thus taking an important step beyond the third-party
underpinnings of standing and retaliation theories. 8 These cases provide an
important model for conceptualizing how discrimination based on race or sex
includes adverse employment action based on an employee's interactions with
members of other race or sex groups. Thus far this promise has been limited by a
narrow construction of the forms of intergroup "association" protected by Title VII.
Focused on a paradigm of racial intermarriage and integration, courts have refused
to take a wider view that would include both broader forms of interaction and
relationships between men and women generally.' 86
1. The Basic Paradigm: Interracial Marriage
The classic fact pattern is an adverse employment action against an employee
because of that employee's interracial marriage or romance. In Parr v. Woodmen of
the World Life Insurance Co.'87 the Eleventh Circuit considered a white man's Title
VII claim that he was refused ajob because of his marriage to a black woman. 88 The
plaintiff s lawyer apparently thought it implausible to argue that the man had suffered
discrimination because of his own race, arguing instead that the "actions taken against
him involved racial considerations."' 89 The court, however, was not so hesitant and
declared that "[w]here a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial
marriage or association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated
against because of his race."'' In doing so, the court followed the widely accepted
argument that identifying an interracial relationship relies on the race of both
parties. 9' The locus classicus is the early case of Whitney v. GreaterNew York Corp.
of Seventh-Day Adventists:92 "Manifestly, if Whitney was discharged because, as
184. See supra Part II.A. 1-2.
185. See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 210-20 and accompanying text.
187. 791 F.2d 888 (1l th Cir. 1986).
188. Id. at 889.
189. Id. at 891; cf Skinnerv. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1447 (10th Cir. 1988)
(allowing race discrimination claim where, "'although [plaintiff] was not fired because of his
race, it was a racial situation in which he became involved that resulted in his discharge from
his employment') (quoting Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266,1268 (6th Cir. 1977)
(alteration in original)).
190. 791 F.2d at 892 (emphasis in original).
191. See id. at 891-92.
192. 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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alleged, the defendant disapproved of a social relationship between a white woman
and a black man, the plaintiff's race was as much a factor in the decision to fire her
as that of her friend."'
93
Courts have used this theory-that discrimination based on difference in race is
indistinguishable from discrimination based on each individual's race-to defeat
employers' frequent argument that they have discriminated not based on their
employee's race but based only on the race of their spouse, an approach adopted by
a minority of courts: "Plaintiff does not contend that he has been discriminated
against because of 'his' race or because of his color, religion, sex or national origin.
He contends that he has been discriminated against because of the race of his wife."'
The court in Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc. 9 ' rejected this argument by reasoning:
"Clearly, if the plaintiffs in those cases, or the plaintiff in the instant case, had been
black, the alleged discrimination would not have occurred. In other words, according
to their allegations, but for their being white, the plaintiffs in these cases would not
have been discriminated against."'"
This but-for analysis not only assumes but requires that the employer's
discrimination is simply about interracial marriage as such and is not part of a broader
discriminatory attitude toward any racial group. This feature leads to conceptual
problems when an employer is accused of both discriminating against white
employees in interracial relationships and againstblack employees in general, and yet
such situations are precisely what we should expect when hostility to interracial
association is linked to antiblack racism. Just this issue arose in Parr."9 The
defendant argued that "Parr cannot state a claim based upon discrimination due to an
interracial relationship because he also claimed that Woodmen discriminated against
blacks. Woodmen argues that if Parr's allegations are true, had Parr been black, he
still would not have been hired."'9 3 Woodmen thus claimed that Parr's allegation
193. Id. at 1366; see also Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581,
589 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing cases on interracial relationships), vacated, 169 F.3d 215 (5th Cir.
1999) (en banc), reinstated, 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam); see generally
Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C., 946 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Moffett v. Gene B.
Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp.
1442 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Holiday v. Belle's Restaurant, 409 F. Supp. 904 (W.D. Pa. 1976);
Bryant v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 390 N.W.2d 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
194. Adams v. Governor's Comm. on Postsecondary Educ., 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1348, 1357, (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3,1981), available at 1981 WL 27101, *3; accord Ripp
v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205,207 (N.D. Ala. 1973); Parrv. United Family Life Ins.
Co., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 95,96 (N.D. Ga. June 15, 1983), available at 1983 WL
1774. Those courts finding for plaintiffs in interracial relationship cases have frequently
rejected similar arguments by employers. See Whitney, 401 F. Supp. at 1366; Deffenbaugh-
Williams, 156 F:3d at 588; Rosenblatt, 946 F. Supp. at 299; Holiday, 409 F. Supp. at 908-09.
195.586 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
196. Id. at 1445 (emphasis in original).
197. See generally 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986).
198. Id. at 892. In Deffenbaugh, defendant Wal-Mart made the opposite argument:
because the white plaintiff essentially claimed that her mistreatment was based on
discrimination against her black boyfriend, her claim that Wal-Mart discriminated against
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failed a simple "but-for" test of discrimination: whetherParrwas black orwhite made
no difference to the hiring decision because Woodmen did not hire whites married
to blacks, nor did it hire any blacks at all.' The Parr court rejected defendant's
argument but retreated conceptually by simply waving off the hypothetical ("if Parr
had been black.. .") as a "lawsuit for another day" and returning to the more diffuse
assertion that "Title VII proscribes race-conscious discriminatory practices."'
In other words, the Parr court failed to meet the challenge posed by Judge
Williams' opinion in Childress: how could the employer discriminate against both
white and black employees because of race? In Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.,"1 for
instance, the court rejected the interracial association claim of one white employee
in large part because he also alleged race discrimination against black employees."2
In language strikingly parallel to that in Childress, the court found the white
plaintiffs associational claim inconsistent with the allegation of discrimination
against blacks: "not only is plaintiff not subject to the practices in which he asserts
that defendants engage, but he is a member of the class (i.e., white persons) which he
avows that defendants favor."203
Even the proplaintiffreasoning employed in Parr, Whitney, and Gresham does not
fully capture the discriminatory dynamics at work."° By focusing simply on the
"interracial" aspect, the approach has difficulty distinguishing the counterargument
that the employer "discriminates" against all employees, regardless of race, who
engage in interracial relationships (that is, both white and black employees in
interracial relationships face discrimination).2"5 As the Supreme Court recognized as
blacks was refuted by the fact that she was actually replaced by a black employee. See 156 F.3d
at 588. The court rightly rejected this argument as misconstruing plaintiff's claim, which as
properly understood alleged discrimination 'because of [her] race' (white), as a result of her
relationship with a black person." Id. (modification in original).
199. Parr, 791 F.2d at 892.
200. Id.
201. 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
202. Id. at 209-10.
203. Id. at 209 (emphasis in original). Compare supra note 71 and accompanying text.
204. See generally Parr, 791 F.2d 888; Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442
(N.D. Ga. 1984); Whitney v. GreaterN. K Corp. ofSeventh-DayAdventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
205. An analogous argument has been invoked against the theory that discrimination
against gay men is sex discrimination because women who love men are treated differently. See
Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *9 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) ("Dillon has
not... argued that a lesbian would have been accepted at the Center, nor has he argued that
a woman known to engage in the disfavored sexual practices would have escaped abuse.").
Discrimination based on sexual orientation (or at least some subset of it) has also increasingly
come to be articulated as sex discrimination not simply because of the but-for comparison to
the treatment of a member of the "opposite" sex with the same sex of object-choice, see, e.g.,
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny under state
constitution's equal protection clause because marriage statute classifies by sex), but because
of the connection between sexual'orientation and gender identity. See Franke, supra note 10,
at 693, 739 (characterizing male heterosexuality as an aspect of masculinity enforced through
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far back as Loving v. Virginia,2' however, antimiscegenation laws were specifically
designed and understood to regulate and preserve a particular vision of whiteness
infused with a commitment to white supremacy. 2 7 On this view, discrimination
against a white person based on his or her interracial relationship both implicates his
or her race as a white person and may be part and parcel of discrimination towards
African-Americans. °8
2. Extending the Paradigm to Other Forms of Interaction
Although the emphasis on interracial association per se is understandable within
a civil rights discourse forged in desegregation battles, it unjustifiably privileges a
particular form of interracial interaction rather than seeing hostility to interracial
intimacy as just one instance of a broader pattern of race- and sex-specific norms of
cross-group interaction. 2" For instance, in Scott v. Marsh"' Grace Scott, a white
male-male harassment); Schultz, ReconceptualizingSexualHarassment,supra note 8, at 1776-
77, 1786-87 (discussing antigay harassment as "operat[ing] to insultthe harassee's manhood").
See generally Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-
Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511
(1992); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV.
187 (1988).
206. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
207. Id. The Court parried the interracial symmetry argument by reference to the structural
role of the practice. Id. at 8-11 (rejecting theory that because "miscegenation statutes punish
equally both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes,
despite their reliance on racial classifications do not constitute an invidious discrimination
based upon race" in part because "[t]he fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages
involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own
justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy"); see also RUTH
FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
WHITENESS 74 (1993) (noting that white-nonwhite unions have been the target of
antimiscegenation laws and sentiment). This racial asymmetry is also reflected in the fact that
all the reported cases of discrimination based on interracial relationships have involved white
plaintiffs. I suspect that in a case alleging the firing of a black employee for a relationship with
a: white person, a court would not invoke rights to interracial association but would instead
forthrightly recognize discrimination against the black employee because of her/his race.
208. Cf Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 2001) (suggesting that there
could be circumstances in which "both men and women suffer sexually discriminatory harms
in the same workplace" if an employer restricted men's interactions with a class of women
facing discrimination).
209. One way to see this is to acknowledge the race-sex intersectionality implicit in much
hostility to interracial sexuality. Historically, and through the present, anxiety about
"miscegenation" has been especially acute regarding whitefemale-black male relationships.
Thus, as Ruth Frankenberg points out, restrictions on interracial sexuality have always also
been about paternalistic relations between white men and white women. See FRANKENBERG,
supra note 207, at 76, 81.
210. Scott v. Marsh, No. Civ.A.3:89-3059, 1994 WL 797678, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 15,
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woman, was denied apromotion afterrefusingher supervisor's requests toparticipate
in a discriminatory scheme against black employees.2' Although the court
acknowledged that "a cause of action for discrimination under Title VII can flow
fromaplaintiff's association with aprotectedminority," '212 it concluded that Scotthad
not stated such a claim because her "allegation does not suggest that her supervisor's
motive for not selecting Plaintiff related to any repulsion for a white woman who
would associate with blacks,"213 thereby invoking the special role of taboos against
interracial sociability.
Limiting the cause of action to one mode of cross-racial interaction (friendly or
romantic "association") while failing to protect another mode (refusal to participate
in discrimination) wrongfully confines protected intergroup association to a private
sphere outside the relations of work. It is not "interracial association" that is protected
by Title VII; rather, Title VII protects employees against any requirement that,
because of one's race, one must interact, ornot interact, with persons of another race
in a particular fashion." 4 One may violate workplace norms regarding racial or gender
roles in any number of different ways to which Title VII should rightly be indifferent;
antidiscrimination law attends to the imposition of those norms as a condition of
employment in the first place."'
Indeed, the limited range of intergroup relationships protected by the interracial
association paradigm repeatedly has led courts to reject claims by white and/or male
plaintiffs who were sanctioned not for loving or befriending persons of another race
but for treating women and people of color fairly or professionally or for refusing to
be party to discrimination against them. In Sidari v. Orleans County,216 for instance,
a white corrections officer invoked the associational theory to protect his interest in
not joining an array of discriminatory harassment of black prisoners; the court
dismissed the claim, reasoning that Sidari could not suffer an "associational loss"
because he had "a professional obligation not to fraternize with inmates."2 7 Similar
reasoning prevailed in Lyman v. Nabil's, Inc.,218 where the court confused Title VII
1994), aff'd mem. 43 F.3d 1468 (4th Cir. 1994).
211. Id. at*l, *3.
212. Id. at *1.
213. Id. at *3.
214. Compare, for instance, the treatment of Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse. The core
of Hopkins' case was not that Title VII specifically protects women's right to engage in
behavior that some people find abrasive and unfeminine but rather that an employer cannot
require that its female employees behave in a"feminine" manner. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
490 U.S. 228, 258 ("We sit not to determine whether Ms. Hopkins is nice, but to decide
whether the partners reacted negatively to her personality because she is a woman.").
215. See Franke, supra note 18, at 7-8 (arguing that "[t]he wrong of sex discrimination
must be understood to include all gender role stereotypes whether imposed upon men, women,
or both men and women in a particular workplace" and that "sexual equality jurisprudence
should include a commitment to a fundamental right to determine one's gender independent
of one's biological sex").
216. 174 F.R.D. 275 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
217. Id. at 284.
218. 903 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Kan. 1995).
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discrimination based on interracial association with the Trafficante line of cases
basing standing on injury to interracial associations, producing a single, muddled
theory of "associational benefit."2"9 The court, however, simply declared that cases
based on interracial association were irrelevant to questions of cross-sex
association. " ° But if sanctioning white employees for associating with nonwhites is
race discrimination, the same reasoning demands that sanctioning male employees for
associating with women is sex discrimination."2
Even courts finding for plaintiffs have foundered on a narrow concept of
"association." One case on which Lyman relied, Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc.,m
involved almost precisely analogous facts with the sole difference of a cross-race
rather than a cross-sex relationship. Chandler, a white employee, was harassed by her
supervisor when she attempted to hire and promote African-Americans. The court
attempted to squeeze its facts into the "associational benefits" framework.' The
court read Chandler's complaint to claim"that defendants' insistence that she enforce
these [discriminatory] practices violated her fundamental right to associate with
African-Americans" and went on to cite Loving v. Virginia and a string of
interracial marriage cases before concluding that "an employment practice that
impinges upon this right is actionable under Title VII.1 " Once again, the
fundamental question-whether Chandler was discriminated against because of her
race when her employer sanctioned her for violating its expectations for how white
employees should interact with African-Americans-was obscured by invocation of
a discrete Title VII "right" to associate. 226
Absent a clear conception of how discrimination against an employee based on his
or her intergroup "association" implicates the employee's race, there is a strong
tendency to shift the focus back to the race of the person with whom the employee
associates. In another successful association case, a district court refused to dismiss
a white plaintiff's Title VII claim alleging that her employer discriminated against her
219. See id. at 1446. See generally Feldman, supra note 15 (treating both the standing
cases and the interracial association cases as reflecting a single legal principle); Johnson v.
Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000) (same).
220. Lyman,. 903 F. Supp. at 1446.
221. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78-79 (1998) (applying to
same-sex discrimination the principles developed for same-race discrimination); Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 619, 627-28 (1987) (applying to affirmative action based on
sex the principles developed for affirmative action based on race); see also Brown v.
Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 254-55 (2d Cir. 2001) (assuming the precedents addressing
interracial association apply to questions of sex discrimination (citing Parr v. Woodmen of the
World Life Ins. Co.,791 F.2d 888 (1 1th Cir. 1986), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I
(1967))). Cf supra Part III.A.3, noting the tendency to apply the Trafficante injury in fact
doctrine to interracial but not intersex association.
222. 868 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Ark 1994).
223. Id. at 1143.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1143-44.
226..See id.
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based on her close "association with the Hispanic community.1'27 The court
concluded that "[t]he underlying rationale in these cases is that the plaintiff was
discriminated against on the basis of his race because his race was different from the
race of the people he associated with."'' The court's stated holding--"discriminatory
employment practices based on an individual's association with people ofaparticular
race or national origin are prohibited under Title VII"--nevertheless entirely omits
reference to the plaintiff s race."29
As the Seventh Circuit recently made clear in Drake v. Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co., ° the "key inquiry" is not the nature or "degree of association"
but simply whether the employee was discriminated against because of his or her
race, such discrimination sometimes being based on whether and how the employee
associates with persons of another race?" The association cases, however, fail to
spell out just what the connection is between an employee's race and his or her
interactions with other groups. That connection is the race-specific expectation of
particular forms of interaction with other groups: it is not just "association" with
black or Hispanic people that is at issue in these cases but rather such associations
undertaken by white employees.
D. Limitations of the Traditional Approaches
Third-party standing, retaliation, and intergroup association theories all share the
same fundamental weakness: none articulates how harms to one employee may be
"because of such individual's race [or] sex,"" 2 based on how he or she relates to
persons of a different race or sex. When the persons with whom the employee has a
227. Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 26-JT, 618 F. Supp. 1458, 1459 (D. Colo.
1985).
228. Id. at 1460.
229. Id.; see also Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, and GMC Trucks,
Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir. 1999) (interpreting interracial association cases as holding
that Title VII "protect[s] individuals who are the victims of discriminatory animus towards
third persons with whom the individuals associate"). Once the focus shifts back to persons with
whom the employee associates, the interracial association framework begins to collapse into
a third-party standing analysis. See Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561,572-78 (6th
Cir. 2000). Johnson is especially interesting because it applied the interracial association theory
to an African-American university vice president's association with other black employees by
virtue of his advocacy of an affirmative action policy. Thus, the but-for reasoning of interracial
cases was displaced by an exclusive focus on the race of those with whom the employee
associated. Johnson's race can be reintroduced into the picture, however, if we interpret his
experience as arising from his deviation from the whiteness his employer demanded of its high-
ranking administrators. Cf. Espinoza & Harris, supra note 10, at 550-51 (arguing that "[e]thnic
groups lacking a stable identification with either" blackness or whiteness face the choice of
whether to "proclaim themselves 'black,"' strive toward "whiteness ... through cultural
assimilation," or "struggle to be accepted as neither").
230. 134 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 1998).
231. Id. at 884.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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solidaristic relationship are themselves employees, courts see the plaintiff as merely
complaining about discrimination directed at others.23' Moreover, when courts rely
on a model of discrimination as employers taking sides in a zero-sum game, theyhave
difficulty conceptualizing how employers could simultaneously discriminate against
some employees because they are black and others because they are white. A
retaliation theory ameliorates this problemby granting a cause of action to members
ofnominally "opposed" groups by labeling one group's injuries "discrimination" and
another's "retaliation." When, however, the employee's relationship is to a
nonemployee or an employee for whom a discrimination claim is difficult to make
out, both standing and retaliation theories-falter for lack of someone other than the
plaintiff whose race- or sex-based injuries bring the controversy under the aegis of
Title VII.
The conceptual interconnection between these theories, and the importance of
identifying the workplace race- or sex-based norms imposed on plaintiffs, are
illustrated in a striking 1975 Second Circuit case. In DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak
Co., David DeMatteis, a white Kodak employee of long tenure, sold to a black
coworker his house in a predominantly white neighborhood where many Kodak
employees lived. In response, DeMatteis was constructively discharged by denial of
medical treatment, of equipment needed to do his job, and of protection from
coworkers' harassment. 5 DeMatteis could not have sought Title VII relief under
even a broad standing approach because no Kodak employment discrimination was
at stake in the housing transaction.
The Second Circuit moved beyond standing to reason that DeMatteis could bring
the claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1866216 because the constructive discharge
was "allegedly in reprisal for his part in vindicating the right of a black
fellow-employee 'to make ... [a] contract[ ]' similar to that which whites in the
neighborhood have freely been able to make." 7 Formally, then, DeMatteis is
analogous to the nondiscrimination-as-opposition cases of St. Anne's Hospital and
Chandlery
This formulation has two weaknesses. First, it focuses entirely on the race of the
party to whom DeMatteis sold his home, even though DeMatteis's and his harassers'
race, and his neighborhood's racial composition, were clearly central to the case. Had
DeMatteis not already lived in a white neighborhood in which his white coworkers
had an interest, the reaction would likely have been less virulent. Apparently, what
enraged his coworkers was not so much that any house was sold to a black family, but
233. See, e.g., supra notes 134 & 203 and accompanying text.
234. 511 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1975).
235. Id. at 307 & n.1.
236. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
237. Id. at 312 (quoting § 1981) (alterations and omissions in original). The court relied
on Sullivan v. Little HuntingPark, 396 U.S. 229 (1969), which gave standing to awhitetenant
expelled from a homeowner's association for leasing to a black family, on the theory that the
white tenant was merely challenging the association's practice of racial discrimination against
African-Americans. A broader theorywas needed in DeMateis because Kodak had no housing
relationship at all to the purchasing family.
238. See supra Part III.B.1-2.
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that a white coworker broke the racist solidaritythat maintained the whiteness of the
residential community." 9
Second, the reasoning turns entirely on the happenstance that the claim was
litigated under § 1981,40 which covers race discrimination in all contracting. Under
Title VII, DeMatteis's sale to a black family would not have vindicated their rights
under the statute, which has no direct bearing on housing transactions. Thus, even
under the broad theory of St. Anne's Hospital-that anynondiscriminatory act counts
as "opposition," even absent a contrary employer request-DeMatteis could not claim
retaliation because his opposition would not have been to an unlawful employment
practice.24'
Instead, DeMatteis should have been able to state a claim for discrimination
against himself based on his race. As a white resident of a segregated community, he
was expected to do his loyal part maintaining its whiteness, but he violated these race-
specific norms and was brutally sanctioned at work. Interference with DeMatteis's
employment was the stick that disciplined him for violating the prevailing view at
Kodak of how white workers should behave, even outside the workplace.
The court's narrow analysis renders DeMatteis's own race invisible, leaving him
not a target of Kodak's race discrimination in employment but a mere conduit for its
endorsement ofdiscrimination in housing. The tension between this approach and the
one taken in the interracial association cases is made clear in another Second Circuit
decision, Albert v. Carovano.42 There, the court offeredacramped reading of claims
for § 1981 discrimination based on white employees' interracialmarriages, recasting
them as claims that plaintiffs had been "retaliated against.., because they did not
engage inpurposeful racial discrimination in a contractual ormarital context." 43 This
approach would eviscerate protection for intergroup association by collapsing it into
the category of "retaliation" and making it derivative of some other act of
discrimination. If taken literally it would conceptualize discrimination against people
who enter interracial marriages as really retaliation for failure to discriminate in
"marital contracting" and thus offer no protection for persons fired for intimate
relationships not formalized inmarriage. I Moreover, on this theory, even employees
239. Cf. Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 1788-89
(arguing that harassment of a male manager who refused to carry out the owner's desired sex
discrimination againstfemale employees came aboutbecausehe "betrayed the type ofdominant
masculinity his supervisor expected of him as a manager").
240. DeMatteis's Title VII claims were dismissed as time barred. See DeMatteis, 511 F.2d
at 309-1I.
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (barring retaliation against employees who
complain about an unlawful employment practice); Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dep't,
176 F.3d 125, 134-36 (2d Cir. 1999); see also supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
242. 851 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc).
243. Id. at 572-73 (emphasis in original).
244. Moreover, the approach would provide no protection for any form of cross-sex
interaction, since § 1981 applies onlyto race discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). See
generally Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609-613 (1987); Ian Ayres, Fair
Driving: Gender andRace Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817,
821 (1991) (noting the "gaping hole in our civil rights laws regarding gender discrimination').
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fired for interracial marriage would have no Title VII claim because the action for
which they were retaliated against-interracial marital "contracting"--is not itself
protected by the statute."5
Bylimiting so-called association claims to situations inwhich they canbereframed
as retaliation-for-nondiscrimination, the Albert court reached for a bright-line rule
defining those interracial "associations" protected against discrimination: only those
themselves subject to § 1981's ban on race discrimination in contracting.2" The
Seventh Circuit's recent opinion in Drake has the better approach. The Drake court
declined to limit associational claims to particular forms or degrees of association and
relied instead on the fundamental elements of a Title VII claim: a cognizable injury
because of the plaintiff's race (or sex, religion, or national origin). 7 The next Part
sets out how employees sanctioned for acts of solidarity toward other groups may
assert such discrimination against themselves, heeding Drake's counsel to integrate
the theory behind interracial association claims into ordinary Title VII analysis.
IV. A STEREOTYPING ANALYSIS OF INTERGROUP SOLIDARITY
Despite some courts' outright rejection of Title VII claims by employees
sanctioned for intergroup solidarity and other courts' awkward attempts to address
them through third-party standing, retaliation, and intergroup association theories,
such claims can be understood squarely within existing Title VII doctrine. If
employers insist that employees conform to sex- or race-based stereotypes regarding
interactions with other race or sex groups, employment practices enforcing those
stereotypes constitute actionable discrimination because of race or sex.
By placing a rich understanding of stereotyping at the center of Title VII analysis,
we can draw on accounts of race and sex as processes of social interaction rather than
as static attributes of individuals. Because a critical way that group identities and
boundaries are formed is through relationships that mark some persons as inside and
245. Albert thus flies in the face of the overwhelming precedent under both § 1981 and
Title VH that discrimination against person A based on a cross-race relationship with person
B is discrimination based on person A's race. See supra Part III.C.; see also Drake v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1981 and Title VII
retaliation cases "provide little guidance" in association claims that turn on discrimination
based on plaintiff's race); Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian Sch., 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980)
(considering § 1981 claim stated by white schoolboy discriminated against for friendship with
black girl).
246. This position allowed the Albert court to dismiss the § 1981 complaints of white
students who alleged that they were disciplined "because they are... supportive of the rights
of blacks [and] Latinos" in the course of a campus protest but who did not identify any § 1981
rights that their actions protected. Albert, 851 F.2d at 572 (alterations and omissions in
original). Indeed, the en bane court warned that "[o]therwise, non-minority plaintiffs could
bring actions where § 1981 rights are not implicated." Id. This prediction, however, is simply
false. White plaintiffs could bring actions where no § 1981 rights of nonwhites were implicated
but only where they alleged that their own § 1981 rights against race discrimination had been
violated: in Albert, rights arising from contracts for education.
247. Drake, 134 F.3d at 884.
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others as outside the group, it should be no surprise that intergroup interaction is
central to those normative expectations of group members that constitute one form
of stereotyping. Moreover, because group relations often are structured hierarchically,
not simply as relationships of difference, stereotypical intergroup interactions may
involve discrimination.
From this perspective, we can elaborate on the observation from Part II that
discriminatory conduct frequentlyrelies forits effectiveness upon coercion within the
group thatmay, in aggregate, benefit from discrimination. Enforcing expectations that
group members will cooperate with, or acquiesce in, subordinating behavior toward
others constitutes discriminatoryrace or gender stereotyping against members of the
"in-group." Far from contradicting simultaneous discrimination against an "out-
group," such suppression of intergroup solidarity can be integral to that
discrimination. This analysis applies not only to sanctions responsive to acts of
intergroup solidarity but also to threatened sanctions that deter such acts by creating
an environment hostile to them. In either case, Title VII's remedial and preventive
aims are well served byprotectingpersons who are injured at work for violating race-
or sex-based norms that frown on intergroup solidarity and that favor agonistic
intergroup relations.
A. Title VII Recognition ofDiscrimination Beyond the Zero-Sum Game
The fundamental conceptual roadblock to viewing harms based on assertions of
intergroup solidarity as actionable discrimination is the zero-sum game model of
discrimination, which itself builds on a view of race and sex as static, homogeneous
traits. From this perspective, discrimination confers disadvantage on groups as a
whole, without internal differentiation, because among women, for instance, there are
not differences themselves based on gender.24 With this model in mind, it becomes
difficult to understand why a member of one group would discriminate against
members of her own group based on the characteristic they share, so same-race and
same-sex discrimination seem implausible. Finally, because discrimination consists
simply of putting a thumb on the scales and depressing the opportunities of one
group, it confers a relative advantage on other groups not similarly burdened. From
this view, a discriminatory practice cannot harm members of two different groups
because ofthe trait that defines each group: if African-Americans are discriminated
against, any harms to whites are despite, not because of, their race.
Despite the elegance and familiarity of this reasoning, which underwrites both the
rejection ofplaintiffs' discrimination claims in Childress and most offers of Title VII
protection under the theories discussed in Part I, courts long have recognized that
discrimination takes more complex forms than the zero-sum game; and Title VII
doctrine has responded accordingly. Indeed, eachprongofthemodel--discrimination
does not select among group members, discrimination does not occur between
248. Race and sex thus differ from features like a fingerprint or height, which, though
fixed, do not easily define internally invariant groups. One might-assign all persons with a
height above five feet to one group, but the group would be internally differentiated by
differences in height, the same characteristic defining the group in the first place. Race and sex,
by contrast, are characteristics that allow only two forms of comparison: same or different.
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members of the same group, discrimination against one group cannot also constitute
or even coexist with discrimination against another-has been rejected by the
Supreme Court and by influential decisions in the courts of appeals.
I. From Disadvantaging Groups to Enforcing Stereotypes
Beginning in the early 1970s, the Supreme Court recognized that discriminatory
practices need not affect all members of the victimized race or sex group equally. In
a type of case known as "sex-plus," the courts struck down employer rules that
harmed only women, but not all women, such as bars on the employment of married
women or women with children. 9 Again, in UA Wv. Johnson Controls,50 the Court
found that a "fetal protection policy" violated Title VII despite the employer's claim
that its practice of denying employment to any unsterilized woman within child-
bearing years was intended not to discriminate against women but to protect their
unborn children.25" ' Actionable discrimination does not require either the aim or the
effect of conferring blanket disadvantage on members of one group; the test instead
is whether workplace consequences flow because of an individual's sex or race.'
Thus, whether other persons of the same sex or race are also discriminated against
(or favored) is not dispositive of an employee's claim. 53
The enforcement of race- or sex-based stereotypes exemplifies discrimination that
directly harms only some members of a group and yet is based on the characteristic
the entire group shares. The leading case is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 4 The
accounting firm Price Waterhouse denied Ann Hopkins partnership in part because
she was perceived to be insufficiently "feminine." 5 Her demeanor, including the
249. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam)
(denying employment to women, but not men, with preschool aged children violates Title VII);
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (no-marriage rule for women
violates Title VII). See generally Wendi D. Barish, Comment, "Sex-Plus" Discrimination: A
Discussion of Fisher v. Vassar College, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 239 (1995) (discussing the
evolution and application of the "sex-plus" doctrine).
250. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
251. Id. at 199 (holding that a finding of discrimination "does not depend on why the
employer discriminates").
252. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,453-54 (1982) ("The principal focus of the
statute is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority
group as a whole.").
253. See id. at 455 ("It is clear that Congress never intended to give an employer license
to discriminate against some employees on the basis of race or sex merelybecause he favorably
treats other members of the employees' group."); Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246,253-54
(2d Cir. 2001) ("[W]hat matters in the end is not how the employer treated other employees,
if any, of a different sex, but how the employer would have treated the plaintiffhad she been
of a different sex.") (emphasis in original); see also Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d
157 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (rejecting argument that plaintiff's replacement by worker of
same race precluded establishment of a prima facie case of race discrimination).
254. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
255. Id. at 234-35.
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manner in which she exercised authority over subordinates, was seen as
inappropriately aggressive for a woman, 6 and she was counseled to modify both her
appearance and behavior to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry. 257 In his plurality
opinion, Justice Brennan observed that "we are beyond the day when an employer
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group." '258 In other words, employment decisions may not be
made on the basis of either empirical assumptions or normative expectations
regarding how group members behave." 9
The bar on enforcing sex- or race-based stereotypes applies regardless of whether
the stereotype concerns behavior in or out of the workplace. Although Price
Waterhouse violated Title VII by penalizing Hopkins for not acting at work as it
thought a woman should, others have violated Title VII by penalizing women for
taking on family roles such as marriage and parenting thought incompatible with
employment for women, though not for men.2" Similarly, in the interracial
association cases discussed above, courts found Title VII violations when white
workers were penalized for developing friendly, intimate, or assistive relationships
with nonwhites, regardless of whether those relationships were with coworkers or
with nonemployees.26'
Price Waterhouse demonstrates that the zero-sum game is an incomplete account
of discrimination under Title VII. The cause of discrimination was not solely
membership in a group defined by fixed bodily features, but was group membership
in conjunction with individual behavior, including forms ofinterpersonal interaction,
256. Id.
257. Id. at 235.
258. Id. at 251 (emphasis added). In addition to the three Justices joining Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion, Justices White and O'Connor concurred in the judgment and
agreed that evidence concerning Hopkins's "failure to conform to the stereotypes credited by
a number of the decisionmakers" showed that sex discrimination was a substantial factor in the
partnership decision. Id. at 272 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at 259
(White, J., concurring in the judgment).
259. See also CityofLos Angeles Dep't ofWater & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,707
(1978) ("Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a woman's inability to perform certain
kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals,
or for paying them less.").
260. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Sprogis v. United
Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971). These decisions show that the Sixth Circuit in Dillon
v. Frank misconstrued the Price Waterhouse Court's reference to the Catch-22 women
faced--"out of ajob if they behave aggressively and out of ajob if they do not," 490 U.S. at
251-as limiting Title VII's reach to those stereotypes concerning workplace behavior. See
Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *10 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
261. See, e.g., Parrv. Woodmen ofthe World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888 (11 th Cir. 1986)
(marriage to nonemployee); Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 26-JT, 618 F. Supp. 1458,
1459 (D. Colo. 1985) (association with the local Hispanic community); Whitney v. Greater
N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (friendship with
nonemployee).
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physical appearance, and bodily deportment. Rather than being discriminated against
for the sex characteristic that marked her as the same as all other women (with respect
to sex), Ann Hopkins was discriminated against for her difference from what her
employers believed women ought to be.
2. Intragroup Discrimination
Once we recognize that discriminatory behavior need not affect all persons with
the "same" race or sex as the victim of discrimination nor even be motivated in racial
or sexual terms,262 the incomprehensibility of same-group discrimination disappears.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.2 63 firmly
repudiated any presumption that individuals will not discriminate against members
of their own groups. After Oncale, the idea that discrimination necessarily involves
members of one group imposing disadvantages on other groups in order to favor their
own simply misstates the breadth and basis of Title VII coverage.2
A full consideration of stereotyping makes intragroup discrimination especially
undirstandable. Although Hopkins was discriminated against by men, nothing in the
stereotyping analysis requires an intergroup context.26 Individuals and institutions
may have ideas about how both men and women ought to look and behave, and there
is no reason not to expect attempts by men to secure other men's conformity to their
ideal of what men ought to be like.266 The Seventh Circuit offered just such an
account in Doe v. City ofBelleville.267 Assessing claims that a boy was harassed by
male coworkers for, among other things, wearing an earring, the court observed that
262. See supra note 247 and accompanying text; see also Parker v. Sony Pictures Entm't,
Inc., 260 F.3d 100, 109 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the issue in a disability discrimination claim
is "whether plaintiff's disability made a difference to [the employer's] decision-making,
regardless of [the employer's] exact motives in considering [plaintiff's] disability").
263. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
264. Courts have not explored at length the dynamics ofintragroup discrimination, simply
citing "the many facets of human motivation," id. at 78 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 499 (1977)), and focusing instead on the abstract possibility that plaintiffs could show
discrimination because of race or sex; see id. at 79-80; see also Carson v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1996).
265. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 870, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001)
(applying Price Waterhouse to a situation in which a male plaintiffs male coworkers and
supervisor "harassed him because he failed to conform to a male stereotype"); Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252,261 n.4 (I st Cir. 1999) (noting that because Oncale
requires applying to same-sex discrimination the same Title VII standards applied to cross-sex
discrimination, "a man can ground a claim on evidence that other men discriminated against
him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity").
266. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 1225-29; Franke, supra note 18, at 95; Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 1774-76.
267. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) (mem.). The
Belleville opinion was vacated and remanded in light of Oncale, so it is offered not for its
precedential value but for the persuasiveness of its reasoning, which is consistent with other
authorities on stereotyping.
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"the evidence suggests not that H. Doe's coworkers were biased against men per se,
but against men who did not conform to their notions of masculinity." '268 Drawing on
Price Waterhouse, the Belleville court rejected the notion that discrimination must be
motivated by "gender-based animus-the harasser's dislike of men or women" 69 as
a class-and embraced Title VII liability for "harassment stemming from the
employee's failure to meet the stereotypical expectations of his gender."27 ° Of course,
sex- and race-based stereotyping implicitly rely on disparate treatment of race or sex
classes exposed to differing standards, but to incur Title VII liability such disparate
treatment need not confer relative disadvantage on the entire class so long as it harms
individuals because of their race or sex.27'
268. Id. at 592; accord Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75; Higgins, 194 F.3d at 261 n.4.
269. Belleville, 119 F.3d at 592; accord U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,
261 n.4 (1991) ("Whether an employment practice involves disparate treatment through
explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on
the explicit terms of the discrimination."); EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263,
1283-84 (1 Ith Cir. 2000) ("[A] plaintiff need not prove that a defendant harbored some special
'animus' or 'malice' towards the protected group to which she belongs."); Thomas v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38,58-60 (1 st Cir. 1999) (holding that"unlawful discrimination can stem
from stereotypes and other types of cognitive biases, as well as from conscious animus").
270. Belleville, 119 F.3d at 592.
271. See Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[Tlhe courts have
consistently emphasized that the ultimate issue is the reasons for the individual plaintiff's
treatment, not the relative treatment of different groups within the workplace.") (emphasis in
original); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1030 (7th Cir. 1979)
(rejecting argument that Title VII forbids only those sex stereotypes that "substantially burden
the female employees more than male employees"). But cf. Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692
F.2d 602, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (characterizing "permissible grooming rules for
male and female employees as those which do not significantly deprive either sex of
employment opportunities, and which are even-handedly applied to employees ofboth sexes").
The concept of relative disadvantage is inadequate to capture the constraints that may be placed
on employees because of their race or sex. Consider, for instance, an employer who requires
male employees to be married and female employees to be unmarried. Surely such a policy
would violate Title VII, even though it may be impossible to characterize men or women as
more severely burdened by the requirement: the burden depends not on whether one is male
or female, but on whether one diverges from the applicable stereotype. Although comparisons
between similarly situated groups of employees may be analytically helpful, they are
unnecessary so long as there is some other basis on which to establish the causal role of the
employee's race, sex, or other protected characteristic. See Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467-68 (2d Cir. 2001); Brown, 257 F.3d at 252-55. In many cases,
however, such stereotypes are part of broader systems of inequality that privilege the
characteristics and behaviors associated with one group. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 1208-09
& n.206 (discussing differential significance of male and female stereotypes because of their
different relationship to the hierarchical valuation of masculine over feminine norms).
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3. Connecting Intragroup Stereotyping and Intergroup Discrimination
Once we recognize that employees harmed because of their deviation from race-
or sex-based stereotypes have been discriminated against under Title VII, the way is
clear to recognizing how members of two nominally "opposed" workplace groups
may both be discriminated against simultaneously. The crucial insight is that one
group's wholesale exclusion from or subordination in the workplace may be linked
to the unlawful imposition of stereotypes on the members of the group or groups for
whom workplace privilege is reserved. 2 In particular, such discriminatory dynamics
may be premised on the organization of the workplace into agonistic groups defined
along race and gender lines.273
This dynamic has long been recognized in institutions that have simultaneously
excluded men while furthering stereotypes of women. In Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan,274 for instance, the Supreme Courtheld that apublic nursingschool
discriminated against Joe Hogan in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by
excluding him from its baccalaureate program because of his sex." Countering the
school's argument that its women-only policy was justified as an attempt to
counteract women's educational disadvantages, the Court concluded that the policy
actually perpetuated stereotypes that "women, not men, should become nurses"'276 in
furtherance of "archaic and overbroad generalizations about women." '2 The Court
also noted that such stereotyping could harm women within nursing through sex
discrimination in wages even while it also harmed men who sought a nursing
education but were excluded.278 A similar pattern is clear in a long line of
employment discrimination cases involving flight attendants, a job category from
which airlines have frequently sought to exclude men in violation of Title VII,2" and
within which airlines have routinely imposed stereotypical notions of ideal women
workers as "single, thin, young ... not pregnant,"2 ' and possessing female "sex
272. See Franke, supra note 18, at 86-87 (arguing that formerly all-male military
educational institutions were "dedicated to the parodic celebration of, and ritual indoctrination
in, the ways of masculinityfor men") (emphasis in original).
273. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 1220 (arguing for understanding "sexual harassment
as a practice rooted in a struggle between men and women in the workplace that perpetuates
both male control and the primacy of conventionally masculine norms"). Although I generally
agree with Abrams' approach, one aim of this Article is to stress that a workplace organized
around a struggle between men and women, or whites and racial minorities, is not merely the
backdrop against which discrimination plays out; instead, this form of agonistic workplace
organization is itself the product of discriminatory practices that force workers into such
relationships which then go on to manufacture other forms of discrimination.
274.458 U.S. 718 (1982).
275. Id. at 719-21.
276. Id. at 730.
277. Id. at730 n.16.
278. Id. at 730-31 n.15.
279. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971);
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
280. Martha Chamallas, Exploring the 'Entire Spectrum' of Disparate Treatment Under
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appeal""' and/or feminine capacities for caring service.212 Courts consideringwomen
flight attendants' discrimination claims have repeatedly rejected the notion that the
airlines' "favoritism" toward women in the sex composition of the job category
negated the possibility of "sex-plus" discrimination in requiring female flight
attendants to conform to sex stereotypes.
23
Title VI: Rules Governing Predominantly Female Jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 30; accord
Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (holding that
weight requirements for all-female job category violated Title VII and noting that "[t]he
exclusively female classification in this case typifies the then-prevailing pattern in the airline
industry of restrictingjob opportunities and imposing special conditions on the basis of gender
stereotypes"); see also Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1980) (no-
marriage requirement); Burwell v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(per curiam) (mandatory maternity leave during pregnancy); Loper v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 582
F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1978) (mandatory resignation at age 32); In re Consolidated Pretrial
Proceedings, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978) (policy barring employment of mothers but not
fathers), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385
(1982); Indav. United Air Lines, Inc., 565 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1977) (no-marriage requirement);
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (weight requirements);
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (no-marriage requirement).
281. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 293, 304 (noting that Title VII "does not eliminate the
commercial exploitation of sex appeal" but does require that employers only "exploit that
attractiveness and allure of a sexually integrated workforce").
282. See Diaz, 442 F.2d 385, 387 (describing airline's assertions that its passengers'
"psychological needs are better attended to by females" who excel at "courteous personalized
service"). See generally Chamallas, supra note 280, at 30; Toni Scott Reed, Flight Attendant
Furies: Is Title VII Really the Solution to Hiring Policy Problems?, 58 J. AIRL. & CoM. 267,
270 (1992) (explaining that "[t]he stewardess, as the ultimate sales pitch, had to be the ultimate
woman").
283. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 605-07 (9th Cir. 1982)
(rejecting airline's argument that "these employees cannot complain ofdiscrimination because
the flight hostess position was a popular one, sought by many women and denied to men, and
therefore the only victims of discrimination were men"); Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444
F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (rejecting airline's contention that its no-marriagerule could
not violateTitle VII because it applied onlyto theall-female category of"stewardess"). But see
Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892, 893 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding no-marriage rule
applied to all-female category of flight attendant but not to other job categories because men
"simply were not involved in the functioning of the policy"); Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 704
F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (following Stroud and dismissing Title VII complaint
alleging sex-based policy of promoting women considered more attractive because "nowhere
does she allege that she has at any time been in competition with a male"). Stroud's
requirement that a Title VII plaintiff identify a worker of a different sex not subject to the
allegedly discriminatory policy is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's clear direction that
Title VII claims are governed by a "but-for" concept of causation, under which the proper
question is whether the same employment policy or decision would have been imposed if
(hypothetically) theplaintiffhad been a member of a different group, not Stroud's question of
whether the policy was imposed (actually) on someone else who is a member of a different
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Applying this analysis to male- and/or white-dominated workplaces simply
requires looking to the specific content of stereotypes in such workplaces. If, for
instance, men expect each other to discriminate against women, then a systematic
campaign of discrimination against women may coexist with discrimination against
some male workers, namely those who violate the stereotyped expectation that they
will close ranks with other men against women workers. Indeed, far from
contradicting the allegation of discrimination against women, discrimination against
those male workers complements and bolsters discrimination against women by
suppressing resistance and encouraging complicity.284
This framework offers a way to understand the intergroup association cases, not
as a special category implicating a "right to interracial association," but rather as
addressing a form of stereotyping especially repugnant to Title VII values. In
Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc., for instance, the white plaintiffalleged that her employer
harassed her for refusing to discriminate against African-Americans. The employer
argued that the allegation of"discriminatory hiring and promotional practices targeted
only at African-Americans" was incompatible with a claim of race discrimination
against a white plaintiff and that Chandler was simply seeking to assert the Title VII
claims of African-Americans.2"5 Although the court concluded that Chandler had a
Title VII claim because the employer's conduct "violated her fundamental right to
group. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,711 (1978)
(holding that Title VII liability turns on the "simple test" of whether the evidence shows
"treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different"); Brown
v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246,253-54 (2d Cir. 2001). In County of Washington v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161 (1981), the Court rejected Stroud's reasoning when it held that women prison guards
could press Title VII claims of wage discrimination despite their membership in an all-female
job category that differed substantially from an all-male category of prison guards. The Court
specifically rejected the idea that "awoman who is discriminatorily underpaid could obtain no
relief-no matter how egregious the discrimination might be-unless her employer also
employed a man in an equal job in the same establishment." Id. at 178; see also Abdu-Brisson
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456,467 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting notion that "the only way
a plaintiff can make out an inference of discrimination is to demonstrate that he was treated
differentlyfrom other similarly situated employees"). See generally Chamallas,supra note280,
at 30-39. In sexual harassment decisions inferring sex discrimination from sex-specific sexual
desire, for instance, courts have no trouble recognizing sex-based causation without resorting
to comparative analysis of other workers in the same job category. See, e.g., Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (noting that "comparative evidence about
how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace" is merely
one "evidentiary route" to a showing of sex discrimination).
284. See Franke, supra note 10, at 759 ("Workplace sexual conduct may injure women
because it objectifies them as sex objects, and it mayinjure men because it assumes that all men
conform to and join into a kind of sexualized hetero-masculine culture."); Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 1774-76 (arguing that male workers'
harassment of men has in common with harassment of women origins in preservation of
masculine image of their jobs); cf Brown, 257 F.3d at 255 (noting that harassment of a male
coworker could be "part of a campaign to isolate her from workplace allies").
285. Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
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associate with African-Americans,"286 the holding that Chandler stated a Title VII
claim can be placed on a firmer footing and integrated with general Title VII
principles by recharacterizing the employer's conduct as insisting that Chandler
conform to its expectation that white employees facilitate the perpetuation of racially
discriminatory hiring practices.
On this view, employer opposition to white employees' interracial "associations"
simply exemplifies the general phenomenon of racial stereotyping. Whether the
"association" at issue involves employees or nonemployees and whether it involves
friendship, sex, acceptance of authority, sale of a home, professional collaboration,
or other interactions is irrelevant for Title VII purposes. A woman who is harassed
because she tries to break into a male-dominated welding job is not discriminated
against because of welding, just as Ann Hopkins was not discriminated against
because of assertiveness. Rather, each is discriminated against because of sex, and
Chandler was discriminated against because of race. We can explain why the
discrimination is based on race or sex by tracing plaintiff s experience to the specific
gendered and racialized norms in a given workplace, but we need not create special
categories for each of the many ways in which persons maybe positioned outside of
such norms. 87 What matters is simply whether an employee is discriminated against
because of that indiidual's race or sex, including because of her or his violation of
stereotyped expectation of how a person of such race and/or sex relates to members
of another race and/or sex.288 Intra- and intergroup relations are fundamentally
connected: being "one of the guys" often means adopting a certain stance toward
women.
289
B. A Richer Account of Race, Gender, and Discrimination
In order to move beyond the zero-sum game, we need different ways of
conceptualizing race and gender and different ways of conceptualizing race and
gender discrimination. Two key concepts integrate the idea of discriminatory
stereotypes concerning intergroup relations with our understanding of the dynamics
of race and gender. First, race and gender are active processes rather than static traits.
Second, these processes are fundamentally social, constituted through the practices
of human interactions and institutions. These ideas help identify additional forms of
discrimination: disciplining individuals who stray from practices necessary to retain
group membership, and generating the very differences between groups that become
associated with and define group membership itself.' ° Glimmers of such a
286. Id.
287. See Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The law does not create
separate causes of action for sex discrimination depending on the reason the employer denies
a woman ajob or ajob benefit.").
288. See Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the "key inquir[y]" was "whether that discrimination was 'because of the
employee's race," not the "degree of association" with a member of another race).
289. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 1229 n.311 (noting the pattern of "an intragroup
dynamic that derives from an intergroup dynamic of subordination").
290. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 8, at 1824-32 (arguing that discriminatory
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reconceptualization abound in courts' embrace of the concept of stereotyping, their
recognition of same-group discrimination, and in their theories of standing,
retaliation, and intergroup association. These doctrinal developments complement the
efforts of scholars in a wide range of academic fields to articulate more robust
accounts of how gender and race actually operate in social life.
1. Reconceptualizing Race and Gender As Ongoing Social Processes
The understanding of race and gender I am advocating is summed up by Candace
West and Sarah Fenstermaker as "an ongoing interactional accomplishment."' On
this view, categorization grounded in the body constitutes only part of what it means
to be a woman or a man, a white, black, or Latino person. Instead, what West and
Fenstermaker refer to as "sex category" or"race category" is coupled with normative
expectations of how members of those categories will look and act. Based on a.
perception of biological sex or physically grounded racial categorization,292 one will
expect other traits and behaviors to follow. Living up to these expectations is a
constant, active process of wearing the right clothes, adopting the right mannerisms,
and responding to others in the right fashion, as well as choosing the right job,
playing the right role within a family, and so on. Though we can readily conceive of
segregation into jobs with blocked opportunities for advancement and job satisfaction forces
women to curtail their career ambitions and refocus their goals on other parts of their lives).
291. West & Fenstermaker, supra note 17, at 9; see also JERRY A. JACOBS, REVOLVING
DOORS: SEX SEGREGATION AND WOMEN'S CAREERS 48, 106-07 (1989) (developing a theory
of "lifelong social control" in which gender roles are not the product of early socialization but
are constantly reinforced).
292. 1 say "perception" because this process of categorization generallydoes not relyupon
any direct observation of the bodily features that supposedly ground these categories in the first
place. A person's sex is something that we habitually infer from a host of features including
body shape, hair length and styling, demeanor, clothing, and so on, not from genitals,
chromosomes, or hormones. See generally Franke, supra note 18, at 38-40 (describing the
primary role of "cultural genitals") (quoting HAROLD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN
ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 116-85 (1967)); SUzANNE J. KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER:
AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL APPROACH (University of Chicago Piess 1985) (1978); see also
SANDRA LiPsrrz BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER 114 (1993) (discussing research showing that
children learn to categorize by sex based on hair styling and clothing and that very young
children are better able to make sex distinctions using such criteria than by direct observation
of genitalia); Suzanne J. Kessler, The Medical Construction of Gender: Case Management of
Intersexed Infants, 16 SIGNS 3, 18-21 (1990) (describing medical interventions in infants with
ambiguous biological markers of sex guided by goal of bringing the body into alignment with
gendered social behavior). Whether or not these categories have any "real" grounding in
biological types is not relevant to this analysis; what matters is that people in practice
incessantly, and usually with great confidence, impute membership in these categories. See also
Michael Omi & Harold Winant, Racial Formations, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN THE
UNITED STATES 13, 16 (Paula Rothenberg ed., 3d ed. 1995) (noting how "[r]ace becomes
'common sense'-a way of comprehending, explaining and acting in the world" and the
disorientation that follows "when people do not act 'black,' 'Latino,' or indeed 'white"').
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a female who is unfeminine, femininity names what we expect of women. Moreover,
convincingly engaging in what Judith Butler refers to as this "performance" that
constitutes being a man or a woman is not ultimately distinct from membership in the
"underlying" group.293 Thus, if someone who initially appears white acts in ways
associated with African-Americans, we may begin to wonder whether we hadn't
simply made a mistake in our initial categorization: perhaps the individual is just very
light skinned. 94 Expectations of race- and gender-appropriate behaviors do not
simply follow from an underlying categorization; the reverse may equally be true.295
Masculinity and whiteness are not static adjectives unproblematically attached to
bodies, but are ongoing achievements that must be continually reenacted, lest they
dissolve for lack of a natural foundation in the body itself.296 As Simone de Beauvoir
put it long ago, "[o]ne is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. '297
These are profoundly social achievements. This is so in many respects, including
293. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 134-41 (1990).
294. See Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 112-13 (1998) (documenting the role of racial
"performance," "[d]oing the things a white man or woman did," in legal determinations of
racial classification).
295. See BUTLER, supra note 293, at 134-41 (characterizing gender as a performance that
produces the fiction of an underlying category ofsex); Franke, supra note 18, at 3 (arguing that
"[t]he targets of antidiscrimination law ... should also include the social processes that
construct and make coherent the categories male and female"); Gross, supra note 294, at 158-
76.
296. See BUTLER, supra note 293, at 16-25, 66-67; Christopher David Ruiz Cameron,
How the Garcia Cousins Lost TheirAccents, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 261, 281-86 (1998) (criticizing
conceptions of race and sex grounded in immutable features of the body); Gross, supra note
294, at 156 (documenting how in the nineteenth-century American South, "[w]hile the essence
of white identity might have been white 'blood,' because blood could not be transparently
known, the evidence that mattered most was evidence about the way people acted out their true
nature"); Angela P. Harris, The Unbearable Lightness ofdentity, 2AFR.-AM. L. & POL'y REP.
207, 217 (1995) (criticizing "the concept of race as a characteristic of peisons rather than as
the marker of a relation of power"); Omi & Winant, supra note 292, at 17, 19 (rejecting idea
of "race as something fixed and immutable-something rooted in 'nature"--in favor of a
concept of "racial formations": an "unstable and 'decentered' complex of social meanings
constantly being transformed by political struggle"); West & Fenstermaker, supra note 17, at
9; West & Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 126 (proposing an understanding of gender as a
routine, methodical, and recurring accomplishment). A focus on race and gender as products
rather than static characteristics is perfectly compatible with attributing an important role to the
bodyitself, both because bodies themselves are shaped through practices ofimedicine, exercise,
diet, grooming, and so on and because the social significance granted to physical characteristics
is not determined by the body itself. See Espinoza & Harris, supra note 10, at 514-15, 542
(arguing that antiblack racism can neither be understood without an account of skin color nor
reduced to it); Kessler, supra note 292, at 17.
297. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (H.M. Parshley trans., Vintage Books
ed., 1989) (1952).
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matters of cultural meaning"'8 and institutional structure,' but for my purposes here,
the relevant aspect is interpersonal interaction, from trivial encounters to ongoing
relationships within institutions. For instance, in some contexts establishing an
identity as a white woman has included exercising authority over nonwhite domestic
servants; 3°0 in another, becoming an adult white woman has required being sexually
sought by white men;30' a man's guiding of a woman's arm affirms the gender
positions of each;. 2 establishing and maintaining a familial role of economic
"provider" by earning a "family wage" has been central to modem masculinity, while
economic independence from fathers and husbands has been a threat to respectable
femininity;0 3 in some circumstances, one retains one's whiteness by deferring to
white supremacy;"' one affirms masculinity by participating in sexual banter about
women;305 and so on.306 These constitutive forms of interaction maybe both inter- and
298. See, e.g., R.W. CONNEL, MASCULINITIES44 (1995) ("Masculinity and femininity are
inherently relational concepts, which have meaning in relation to each other, as a social
demarcation and a cultural opposition."); DRUCILLACORNELL, BEYONDACCOMMODATION 79-
118 (1991) (discussing how concepts of male and female are defined and understood through
opposition to the other within a hierarchical framework); Espinoza & Harris, supra note 10,
at 511 (arguing that whiteness has been constructed through contrast with blackness).
299. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 45 (describing how African-American disadvantage
has been created through systematically discriminatory practices in housing, lending,
transportation, education, and employment); Evelyn N. Glenn, From Servitude to Service
Work: Historical Continuities in the Racial Division ofPaid Reproductive Labor, 18 SIGNS 1,
8 (1992) (noting that the labor of women of color has allowed white women to achieve
normative domesticity by maintaining middle-class standards without performing demanding
menial labor); Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 8, at 1832-39 (arguing that sex differences
in attitudes towards employment are produced by institutional practices of sex segregation);
Symposium, On West and Fenstermaker's "Doing Difference, "9 GENDER& Soc'Y 491,500,
504-05 (1995) (criticizing West & Fenstermaker, supra note 17, for excessive focus on face-to-
face relations without adequate consideration of institutional context).
300. Glenn, supra note 299, at 9.
301. Frances W. Twine, Brown-Skinned White Girls, in DISPLACINGWHITENESS: ESSAYS
IN SOCIAL AND CULTURALCRITICISM 214,232 (Ruth Frankenberg ed., 1995) ("A woman must
be desired and publicly recognized as the legitimate romantic partner of a white male in order
to maintain a white cultural identity.").
302. West & Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 135.
303. See generally ARDIS CAMERON, RADICALS OFTHE WORST SORT: LABORING WOMEN
IN LAWRENCE, MASSACHUSETTS, 1860-1912 (1993); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN'S
WAGE (1990).
304. See When Does the Unreasonable Act Make Sense?, in RACE TRAITOR 36 (Noel
Ignatiev & John Garvey eds., 1996) ("The rules of the white club do not require that all
members be strong advocates of white supremacy, merely that they defer to the prejudices of
others. The need to maintain racial solidarity imposes a stifling conformity on whites, on any
subject touching even remotely on race.").
305. See Franke, supra note 10, at 739.
306. See also Omi & Winant, supra note 292, at 16-17 (describing "racial etiquette"
governing the "interactions of daily life" and "presentation of self").
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intragroup; indeed, group boundaries may themselves be established through such
performances. Notably, manyofthe ways ofdoingrace or gender involve interactions
that assert and enact relationships not only of difference, but of hierarchy."
A virtue of the "performance" metaphor is its implicit assumption of an audience,
and different audiences have different expectations. The content ofrace- and gender-
specific norms of interaction change with context. Masculinity may require relating
to men one way and women another, and may further depend on the race of both
oneself and others.3"' More generally, group-specific standards of social interaction
may vary with considerations other than those defining the group: gender-appropriate
behavior may depend on age, family relation, place in organizational structure, and
so on, and it may vary among social settings, such as whether one is on the job or at
home, in a position of authority or inferiority, and so on."
2. Reconceptualizing Discrimination As the Creation of Unequal Group Relations
Nothing in this understanding of gender and race prevents us from recognizing
familiar forms of discrimination in which advantages and harms are distributed on the
basis of established group membership. The new understanding does, however, bring
to the fore other modes of discrimination that implicate the creation and maintenance
of group membership and the social relations implicit in it. Stereotyping presents the
simplest example. Because of membership in a race or sex category, an individual is
expected to behave in a particular fashion in a particular context. When Ann Hopkins
did not conform to the image and behavior Price Waterhouse expected from her as
a woman worker, she was refused entry to the partnership. This is a form of sex
discrimination, as the Supreme Court recognized.31 0
307. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 8, at 318 (discussing association of African-Americans
with jobs requiring servile relationships to whites); Espinoza & Harris, supra note 10, at 516
("Learning to distinguish oneself from and express contempt for blacks is part of the ritual
through which immigrant groups become 'American."') (citing Toni Morrison in Bonnie
Angelo, The Pain ofBeing Black, TIME, May 22, 1989, at 120); Franke, supra note 10, at 760
(arguing that sexual subordination of women is a central component of masculine identity
enforced through workplace harassment); Yount, supra note 25, at 410 (noting that male
miners demonstrated their masculinity by asserting women's dependence on them to perform
physically demanding tasks).
308. See generally FRANKENBERG, supra note 207, at 74-87 (discussing intersection
between race and gender-based norms of sexual interaction); Peggie R. Smith, Separate
Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII, 14 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 21 (1991) (discussing
specificity ofdiscrimination to African-American women inadequately captured by considering
race and gender separately); Caldwell, supra note 10.
309. See, e.g., Yount, supra note 25, at 399 (arguing that gendered workplace norms are
specific to the coal mines Yount studied rather than simply being the "spillover" into the mines
of general patterns); CYNTFHIA COCKBURN, MACHINERY OF DOMINANCE: WOMEN, MEN, AND
TECHNICALKNOw-HOW 195-97 (1988); Schultz, ReconceptualizingSexualHarassment, supra
note 8, at 1760-61, 1776 & n.475 (emphasizing specificity of gender-based norms to particular
workplace contexts).
310. See supra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
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Regulating behavior based on race or sex categorization, however, goes beyond
simple enforcement of preexisting norms. The very act of enforcement may itself
function to produce both differentiation among groups and relationships between
thern?" If a male superior harasses a female subordinate when she asserts her
independence and desire for advancement, he not only disciplines her for deviating
from gendered expectations but simultaneously communicates to others in the
workplace the expectation that men ought to exercise workplace authority and women
submit to it. Moreover, his behavior helps make it true that men are comfortable
exerting authority and that women tend to submit to it. Over time, such patterns may
influence the preferences of men and women to conform with these expectations,
such that men learn to seek and take pleasure in authority and high-rankingjobs while
women are discouraged from doing so and orient their goals toward other sources of
workplace rewards or toward satisfactions offered by other parts of life.312
Understanding race and gender as active, ongoing processes also opens up the
possibility that they can be done differently."' These moments of resistance, and the
sanctions that follow, characterize the cases discussed above and many similar
instances of employment discrimination: women in traditionally female jobs who
resist being cast as sexualized, trivialized playthings of authoritative men;3 4 whites
who integrate their neighborhoods by selling their houses to blacks; whites who
refuse to carry out discriminatory orders; men who take time off work to share
childcare and housekeeping responsibilities with female partners;315 black women
311. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 1218-19.
312. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 8, at 1832-39; see also Nancy Folbre &
Thomas E. Weisskopf, Did Father Know Best? Families, Markets, and the Supply of Caring
Labor, in EcoNoMIcs, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 171, 175, 183-84 (A. Ben-Ner & L.
Putterman eds., 1998) (discussing social shaping of attitudes towards caretaking work); cf.
Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From
Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753,801-24 (1994) (examining ways
in which coercive and subordinating workplace governance regimes may function to generate
worker acceptance of those regimes as legitimate).
313. See BUTLER, supra note 293, at 136-49 (arguing for seeing in the practice of drag the
possibilities for subversive repetitions that expose the contingencies of gender through parody).
Jerry Jacobs' examination ofwomen's occupational preferences, for instance, shows that adult
women's segregation into female-dominated jobs cannot be explained by childhood
socialization, and thus that gendered divisions of labor are much more open to revision than
a theory of fixed preferences would predict. JACOBS, supra note 291, at 52-53 (noting that
instability of adult preferences explains changes in sex segregation among adults, in contrast
to theories that assume the formation of fixed preferences in childhood and early adulthood).
Not only does the need for continual reenactment provide opportunities for disruption through
resistance, but the inherent ambiguities in how norms are to be extended to new circumstances,
and in which among many possible norms are most applicable to a given circumstance, make
room for individual and collective agency. See, e.g., SABINA LOVIBOND, REALISM AND
IMAGINATION IN ETmCS 192-93, 197-200 (1983).
314. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 1767-68.
315. See Berdahl, supra note 44, at 540.
I decided that I would take three weeks off to help my wife get adjusted to having
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who refuse ad hoc assignments to heavy cleaning unrelated to their normal duties;316
and so on.
If engaging in particular patterns of relationships between persons of different
races and genders is part of what constitutes being a certain race and gender, then
changing these relationships means changing, or resisting, the normative race and
gender roles of all the parties to the interaction. 317 This remains true when the forms
of interaction being resisted are hierarchical ones. If part of being white consists of
disparaging or subordinating blacks, and part of being black consists of being
subjected to degradation and subordination by whites, then creating egalitarian
relationships between whites and blacks means challenging what it has meant both
to be white and to be black, notwithstanding that the relationship has offered relative
advantage to whites.
Conversely, enforcing a system of social relations in which whites and blacks are
socially differentiated into dominant and subordinate groups is a practice that
enforces a particular vision of what it means to be white on whites and a particular
vision of what it means to be black on blacks; in so doing, enforcing stereotypes
produces racial domination arrayed across socially significant racial difference.318
This, I argue, is racial discrimination. The zero-sum game is not just the premise of
discrimination, it is its product.
V. IDENTIFYING DISCRIMINATION BASED ON INTERGROUP SOLIDARITY
A way to solve the puzzle of Childress is now before us. Hostility to intergroup
solidarity may constitute actionable employinent discrimination when it imposes race-
or sex-based stereotypes on employees. A single set of social relationships between
members of, for instance, different sexes may implicate the gender identity of both
groups, even when the relationship is a hierarchical one. Practices that promote or
require such relationships can therefore discriminate based on the sex of members of
both groups through a process of simultaneous stereotyping. The disadvantages
imposed on the subordinated group may constitute an independent basis for charging
discrimination, but this does not undermine the claims of members of a dominant
a baby and a 19-month-old.... Comments were made and my work wasn't being
covered so I ended up only taking a week and two days off. It made me feel like
I wasn't a "man" if I choose to stay home and take care of the kids. This same
attitude manifests when I ask to take time off so I can take the kids to the doctor,
after all my wife works outside the home as well and we try to share these types
of chores equally.
Id.
316. See Slack v. Havens, No. 72-59-GT, 1973 WL 339, at *5 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 1973),
a~fJ'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
317. See supra Part IV.A.
318. Indeed, Katherine Franke posits a similar dynamic as the essence of sexual
harassment: "[S]exual harassment of a woman by a man is an instance of sexism precisely
because the act embodies fundamental gender stereotypes: men as sexual conquerors and
women as sexually conquered, men as masculine sexual subjects and women as feminine sexual
objects." Franke, supra note 10, at 693.
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group who engage in intergroup solidarity contrary to stereotyped expectations.
In Childress the white and male plaintiffs attempted to resist the race and gender
roles their superiors expected of them. The supervisors created an environment in
which a real Richmond police officer was a white man who lived up to that identity
by disparaging female and/or black coworkers. Obviously hostile to any women or
persons of color, this environment was also hostile to whites and men committed to
an egalitarian ideal of cross-race, cross-sex cooperation. When the officers contested
these expectations, they were severely sanctioned. The plaintiffs claimed that in a
working environment where racial and sexual antagonism was itself normative, all
workers suffered from abusive conditions of employment based on each individual's
race and sex.319 In such a situation, especially in an occupation as historically
dominated by white men as policing,320 one might have expected the white male
officers themselves to join in the harassment of their peers, attempting to establish an
environment conducive to "teamwork" solely among themselves through
discriminatory practices that claimed policing as an exclusively white, male
domain.32' By rejecting a model of policing and, implicitly, of their own racial and
gender identity, that relied on the force looking "like it used to be" and on relating to
white and black women not as coworkers but as "pussies" and "worthless black
bitches," the officers acted on the vision of racial and sexual equality embedded in
Title VII. And yet they found no protection m the statute.
This Part analyzes how claims of discrimination, like those in Childress, based on
intergroup solidarity fit into the doctrinal framework of Title VII litigation. Like all
Title VII plaintiffs, employees asserting such claims must prove that their workplace
injuries occurred because of their own race or sex and, when those injuries are not
tangible employment actions, that they result from a severely or pervasively hostile
work environment.3" These requirements provide appropriate fact-sensitive
safeguards against unmeritorious claims rather thanper se limits on the circumstances
319. Of course, if some white, male officers had opted for their supervisors' model of
intergroup antagonism, it would not have been abusive to them, but this was not the case. See
infra Part V.C.2.
320. See supra note 62.
321. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 1755
(explaining "harassment as a means to reclaim favored lines of work and work competence as
masculine-identified turf-in the face of a threat posed by the presence of women (or lesser
men) who seek to claim these prerogatives as their own").
322. See generally Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-54 (1998)
(discussing distinction between tangible employment actions and hostile work environments).
In hostile work environment cases, Title VII also requires a separate inquiry into whether an
employer is responsible for the hostile environment, whereas such responsibility is automatic
in the case of a tangible employment action. Id. at 761-63. When the hostile work environment
is created by a supervisor, the plaintiff's burden is to prove sex- or race-based causation and
sufficient severity to modify the terms or conditions of employment; the employer may
affirmatively defend by proving that it took reasonable steps to prevent or correct such an
environment and that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or
corrective opportunities offered by the employer. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 807-08 (1998). My focus here is on the plaintiff's burden.
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in which employees may allege discrimination.
A. Identifying the Role of Race and/or Sex Stereotyping in Intergroup Behavior
In Childress, as in many cases brought under either retaliation or association
theories, the plaintiffs were personally targeted for formal employment sanctions and
workplace harassment in response to some form of intergroup behavior. The primary
question in such cases is whether the response can be interpreted as being based on
the plaintiff's sex or race. Without such a prohibited cause, no workplace injury, no
matter how severe or unjustified, comes within the purview of Title VII.3" Focusing
on this point, the Childress court, for instance, simply assumed that disadvantageous
transfers and negative performance evaluations following complaints about
harassment of coworkers could not have been because of the white, male officers'
race and sex. Courts have long emphasized, however, that proof that an employee's
race or sex played a role may come in a wide variety of forms,324 and numerous
features of the workplace context-its structure and its explicit and implicit
norms-may suggest the role of race and sex stereotyping in cases arising out of
intergroup solidarity.
Occasionally, employers make explicit their expectations of race- or sex-based
intergroup interactions, either spontaneously or in response to a breach. Some
interracial association cases have fit this model, with white plaintiffs alleging that
they were explicitly warned not to associate with black coworkers or that they "would
never move up with the company being associated with a black man." 325 Similarly,
in many male-male harassment cases, coworkers have made clear that a male
worker's masculinity would be called into doubt if he failed to engage in particular
kinds of relationships with women, such as the insistence "that one had to be married
to work there., 326 Such comments directly reveal expectations of particular forms of
323. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
324. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141,147 (2000)
(noting the need for employment discrimination plaintiffs to rely on circumstantial evidence
and holding that the falsity of an employer's explanation of its actions supports an inference
of discrimination); Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996).
325. Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart StoresInc., 156 F.3d 581,585 (5th Cir. 1998),
vacated en banc, 169 F.3d 215 (Sth Cir. 1999),panel opinion reinstateden banc, 182 F.3d 333
(5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Similarly, in Moffett, a colleague told a white woman that "'Hey,
if you go out with that goddamn nigger, I'm going to kick your ass... You should have
learned from the last one,' referring to a previous relationship [plaintiff] had with a black man."
Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244,253 (N.D. Ind. 1985); see also Ripp v. Dobbs
Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 208 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
326. Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1453 (N.D. Il1. 1988); see also Nichols
v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (supporting the conclusion that
plaintiff was discriminated against based on gender stereotypes with the fact that his coworkers
"derided [him] for not having sexual intercourse with a waitress who was his friend"); SHARON
TRAWEEK, BEAMTIMES AND LIFETIMES: THE WORLD OFHIGH ENERGY PHYSICISTS 83-84 (1988)
(discussing how marriage is integral to the image and lifestyle of the successful male physicist);
Franke, supra note 10, at 739 (describing expectations ofmen's heterosexual experience with
2002]
INDIA NA LA WJOURNAL
intergroup behavior.327
Evidence of discriminatory causation may also be found in workplace behavior that
clearly marks certain actions towards members of other groups as breaking ranks with
one's own. Negative references to fondness for other groups or "disloyalty" to one's
own are important signals that an employee has violated workplace expectations that
set groups against each other and rigidly restrict the range of relationships available
across group boundaries. In Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. ,32 for
instance, a white man initiated a friendship with two black newcomers and later filed
an unrelated grievance against a white coworker.329 During an argument over the
grievance, the coworker explicitly gave a racial cast to Drake's actions, linking his
apparent disloyalty to white coworkers with his inappropriately warm relations with
black coworkers by demanding, "Why don't you take your nose and put it up the
black's ass like you have always got it and keep it there?""33 In such circumstances,
acts of intergroup workplace solidarity are marked as violating a group identity itself
built on exclusionary or subordinating relations with other groups. Signals of such
expectations may include explicit accusations of "disloyalty";33 symbolic rejections
of group membership through rhetorical linkage to other groups, such as calling a
white person "nigger lover 33 2 or targeting a man with epithets usually directed at
women;333 or social shunning.334
and interest in women). Other comments might articulate expectations that whites or men not
show professional respect for women or people of color by taking their ideas seriously,
accepting their authority, providing ordinary mentoring, back-up, or informal training, or
otherwise recognizing and welcoming their legitimate workplace presence as full equals. See
JONES, supra note 8, at 302, 349; Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note
8, at 1763-65.
327. There is no need for racial or gendered commentary to occur in a plaintiff's presence
nor for it to refer directly to him or her. A supervisor's race- or sex-specific expectations of
intergroup behavior may simply be revealed to one employee and enforced against another. The
Price Waterhouse Court, for instance, relied in part on remarks made in confidential
evaluations. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235, 256 (1989).
328. 134 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 1998).
329. See id. at 881.
330. Id. at 882.
331. See Skinnerv. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1441 (10th Cir. 1988); Gavenda
v. Orleans City, No. 97-CV-0074E(SC), 1997 WL 662353, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1997).
In another case, a white employee was harassed with the epithet "white rat" for his opposition
to discrimination against African-American colleagues. See Raab, supra note 37, at 39.
332. Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 254 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
333. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001)
(supporting the conclusion that plaintiffwas discriminated against based on gender stereotypes
with the fact that his coworkers referred to him as "she," "her," and vulgar names "bast in
female terms"); Schultz, Reconceptualizing SexualHarassment, supra note 8, at 1802; see also
Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 575 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting process by which
an employer "impute[s]" to a person engaging in intergroup solidarity the race of those with
whom he is associated).
334. See Drake, 134 F.3d at 882 (discussing plaintiff's claim that "no one would talk to
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When what is at issue are workplace expectations of how members of different
groups should interact, conduct directed at one group may also be relevant to separate
actions directed at another. Consider, for instance, a workplace in which male
workers refuse to treat women as competent coworkers but instead insist on
interacting with them in sexualized terms, patronizing them, and questioning their
competence and authority. Because suchbehaviormakes clear to women the gendered
terms on which they are expected to interact with these workers as men, it could also
support an inference that workplace sanctions against men who violate these norms
are likewise based on sex. Norms maybe articulated by example as well as by explicit
statement.
The causation inquiry should also incorporate attention to the structural context of
the workplace. 35 As Vicki Schultz has argued, in occupations and workplaces
characterized by significant race or sex segregation, it is especially likely that what
it means to be a good worker will be identified with membership in the predominant
race or sex group and with conformity to behaviors expected of such members; in
such circumstances, jobs themselves become racially or sexually coded as white jobs
or men's jobs.3 In a male-dominated job, for instance, it may be important to
establish one's masculinity by joining with other men to maintain the gendered
character of the job through such practices as excluding women from the workplace
altogether, confining them to distinct and subordinate niches, or engaging in gendered
behavior towards nonemployee women on or off the job.33 The facts of Childress
reflect this dynamic?
This structural analysis of the link between occupational segregation and
stereotyping is especially applicable when intergroup behavior is at issue. When a
member of a race or sex group that dominates a job category breaks from a pattern
of workplace norms concerning interactions with other race or sex groups,339 an
him at the plant and that whenever he or [his coworker and wife] went into the plant's break
room, the other workers would 'get up and walk off'").
335. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 1800; see also
Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting significance ofthe fact
that harassment occurred "in a large group in which [plaintiff] was the only female").
336. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 1800. See
generally JONES, supra note 8.
337. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing SexualHarassment, supra note 8, at 1776; Deborah
M. Thompson, "The Woman in the Street:" Reclaiming the Public Space from Sexual
Harassment, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 313, 324 (1994) (characterizing construction workers'
harassment of women passersby as "perpetuat[ing] the invidious stereotype that blue-collar
jobs are male turf'). Similarly, when women enter trades dominated by white men, they are
often subjected to loyalty tests through which they are expected to establish a common work
identity, despite difference in gender, byjoining in racially exclusive behaviors. See supra note
39 and accompanying text.
338. Not only was the Richmond police department dominated by white men, see supra
text accompanying note 62, but Lieutenant Carroll explicitly articulated his racism and sexism
through a preference for an all-white, all-male police force.
339. Such a break could take various forms: verbal objection to common practice, such
as the officers' complaints in Childress; active refusal to join in the practice, such as
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especially strong inference can be drawn that any resulting sanctions are based on the
employee's race or sex. In other words, when a group of male workers enforces
particular expectations of how one interacts with women, it is particularly likely that
masculinity itself is at stake, more so than for expectations that have no overt
gendered character. When no intergroup behavior is at issue, it is more likely that
normative conduct in a segregated workplace does not implicate the common race or
gender trait, such as in a male-dominated workplace in which workers may face abuse
because they support the wrong political party or listen to the wrong kind of music.
B. The Dual Significance of Race- and/or Sex-Based Workplace Hostility
In Childress, the clearest evidence that race and sex were at issue in the Richmond
police department's reaction to the officers' complaints was Lieutenant Carroll's
racist and sexist behavior prior to the complaint. His remarks plainly reflected
hostility to women and African-American officers. I argued above that it is perfectly
consistent for this antiblack, antiwoman animus to be coupled with race- and sex-
based expectations that other white, male officers share in and act on this hostility.
The further question, which I address in this Section, is whether the same specific
acts that contribute to a racially and/or sexually hostile work environment for black
or female officers can also do so for white men. In other words, when employers
explicitly direct employees to discriminate against members of other groups,"
overrule employees' nondiscriminatory efforts,34' or fill their workplaces with
discrimination against other groups,"' can employees have what the Eight Circuit in
Clayton v. White Hall School District 3 called a Title VII cause of action for "racial
or other discrimination in the workplace [so] offensive or distasteful ... [that] it
violates that employee's right to work in an atmosphere free of discrimination"? 3"
Considering how an employee's own race or sex is implicated by employer actions
toward members of other groups significantly affects which actions are relevant to
establishing the severity and pervasiveness of harassment, as well as the ability to
show that subsequent harassment or tangible employment actions were based on race
noncooperation with schemes to discriminate, see, e.g., Spillman v. Carter, 918 F.Supp. 336,
339 (D. Kan. 1996); or affirmative acts that run contrary to the expected practice, such as
hiring, promoting, or otherwise facilitating entry of women or people of color into traditionally
segregated jobs, see, e.g., EEOC v. St. Anne's Hosp. of Chicago, 664 F.2d 128, 129-30 (7th
Cir. 1981); supra notes 21-23, 149-156, 221-25, 282-87 and accompanying text.
340. See Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982); Spillman v.
Carter, 918 F. Supp. 336 (D. Kan. 1996); Lyman v. Nabil's Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Kan.
1995); Scott v. Marsh, No. Civ.A.3:89-3059, 1994 WL 797678, at *1, *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 15,
1994), aff'd mem. 43 F.3d 1468 (4th Cir. 1994); Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205
(N.D. Ala. 1973).
341. See Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1447 (10th Cir. 1988);
Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1138, 1143-44 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
342. See Sidari v. Orleans County, 174 F.R.D. 275,282-83 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Lyman, 903
F. Supp. at 1448.
343. 778 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1985).
344. Id. at 459.
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or sex.345 In cases like Lyman or Childress, a supervisor or coworker first requests,
reveals, orbegins discriminatorybehaviors toward others and subsequently sanctions
an employee who responds with intergroup solidarity. The question is whether the
first phase of discrimination against others contributes to a hostile environment on the
basis of the subsequently sanctioned employee's race or sex, 'or whether only
behavior targeted at the plaintiffindividually maybe considered.346 Once we dispense
with the zero-sum- game model, there is no reason to assume that a single act or
statement cannot express and convey hostility both to members of groups targeted for
discrimination and to members of other groups who refuse to join in that
discriminatory endeavor.347
To connect, for instance, discriminatory behavior toward people of color to an
environment hostile to a white worker, we must cross three hurdles: first, that the
actions generating a hostile environment need not be overtly directed at the
discriminatee; second, that the actions generating the hostile environment need not
on their face target persons of the same race or sex as the discriminatee; and third,
that actions overtly discriminatory against one group may create an environment
hostile to some members of the group generally advantaged by that discrimination.
Each problem reflects the concern expressed in Childress about recovery for
"discrimination directed at others.
348
1. Connecting Discrimination Against Others to Discrimination Against Oneself
Behaviors, statements, and symbols directed at other members of one's group, or
even at no individuals in particular, have long been recognized to contribute to hostile
work environments.349 The D.C. Circuit first suggested the possibility in Meritor
itself: "Even a woman who was never herself the object of harassment might have a
Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere where such harassment
was pervasive," 350 and courts have had little trouble with it since.35'
345. In many cases, conduct that reflects discriminatory animus will both (a) contribute
to the creation of a hostile work environment, and (b) provide evidence that other, facially
neutral conduct was in fact based on race or sex. See, e.g., Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 696
(2d Cir. 2001); Pitre v. W. Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 1988).
346. The answer is potentially significant for two reasons. First, it affects analysis of the
number and temporal span of incidents alleged to create a hostile environment, key elements
in assessing the severity and pervasiveness of a hostile eiivironment. See Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). Second, if discrimination against others is continuous with the
harassment of plaintiff, then plaintiff's complaints to supervisors coricerning that
discrimination may satisfy his or her obligation to take advantage of internal grievance
mechanisms prior to holding the employer vicariously liable for a hostile work environment.
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
347. I am leaving aside questions of severity, that is, how hostile the environment is, and
focusing simply on causation, that is, whether whatever impact the environment has is because
of the employee's race or sex.
348. Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
349. See generally O'Connor, supra note 15, at 508-12.
350. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd inpart and rev'd in part
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Indeed, an important recent decision held that a discriminatorily hostile
environment maybe created entirely by actions directed at others. InLeibovitz v. New
York City Transit Authority,352 the plaintiff "was always treated appropriately and
with respect by her coworkers and by her employer" and was never "personally the
target of inappropriate sexual behavior."3 3 A jury found, however, that as a result of
harassment of other women in her shop "her workplace was so permeated with
discriminatory sexual behavior that was so severe or pervasive that it altered the
conditions of her own employment, and created an abusive working environment for
her."3" Rejecting defendant's motions for a directed verdict or a new trial, Judge
Weinstein held that "[p]ersonal harassment is not the gravamen of a hostile work
environment claim."35 The court addressed the psychological and emotional
plausibility of such a claim as follows:
Would a rare Jewish person in a Nazi concentration camp afforded
privileged treatment while other Jews were being horriblypersecuted have
sub nom, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
351. In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), for
instance, the court held that "behavior that is not directed at a particular individual or group
of individuals" may "create[] a barrier to the progress of women in the workplace because it"
conveys the message that they do not belong, that they are welcome in the workplace only if
they will subvert their identities to the sexual stereotypes prevalent in that environment." Id.
at 1522-23; see also Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987).
352. 4 F. Supp. 2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), rev'd, 252 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001). The
significance of the reversal is discussed infra at note 355.
353. Id. at 146.
354. Id. at 147. Leibovitz thus differs from Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1278
(D.D.C. 1988), and King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1985), which also allowed
harassment claims based on conduct directed at others, but in the distinct context of claims
based on supervisors' favoritism toward other women who accepted the supervisors' sexual
advances. Other courts have questioned whether this scenario can constitute sex discrimination,
given that thoSe not sexually involved with the supervisor include both men and women. See
DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1986); Mary C.
Manemann, The Meaning of "Sex" in Title VII: Is Favoring an Employee Lover a Violation
of the Act?, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 612, 653-54 (1989) (interpreting Broderick as a case not of an
isolated instance of nepotism but rather of systematically valuing women employees according
to their interest and success in relating to male supervisors in a sexual manner). These
objections to claims based on sexual favoritism, however, are not applicable to Leibovitz.
355. Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d. at 150. In reversing the district court's decision, the Second
Circuit did not rule on Judge Weinstein's conclusion thatpersonal harassmentwas unnecessary
to a hostile environment claim. See 252 F.3d at 190. Instead, the court concluded that the
hostility of the environment lacked the severity necessary for a successful claim because
Leibovitz (1) did not personally witness any of the incidents of harassment, (2) learned of the
incidents second hand, and (3) did not share ajob, work area, or supervisor who harassed her
coworkers. Id.; see also discussion infra Part V.C.2 (arguing that plaintiffs own reaction to
workplace harassment is probative of the severity of the hostility); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev.
Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1456 (7th Cir. 1994).
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no claim for the psychological trauma of having to witness the abuse?
The deterioration of the humanity, spirit, and dignity of a member of an
abused class, granted personal immunity on her promise that she will
remain silent ... is impermissible under findamental ethics and law ....
No one would suggest that the conditions at plaintiff s workplace were
comparable to those at the death camps. Nevertheless, the general
principle regarding a responsible person's distress at observing other's
[sic] suffering does apply."6
As this analysis suggests, the workplace environment may also be rendered hostile
by actions directed at nonemployees. Indeed, Judge Goldberg's seminal opinion in
Rogers v. EEOC3  grew out of precisely such facts: Josephine Chavez charged that
her employer's practice of "segregating the patients" at its optometry practice
discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin.35 That the behavior was
directed at patients was irrelevant because it could nonetheless subject the plaintiff
to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" of working in an
"environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination."359 Thus, "[t]he
concept that witnessing the harassment of others can create an actionable hostile work
environment" originates with the hostile work environment theory itself.3
2. Hostile Work Environments That Cross Group Boundaries
Strikingly, Judge Goldberg's elaboration of the hostile environment concept never
relied on the racial or ethnic position of Chavez, the plaintiff, but focused solely on
how discrimination against nonemployee patients affected the workplace
atmosphere.36" ' This feature and the opinion's reference to "ethnic or racial
discrimination" '362 are hardly accidental because, contrary to how it is routinely
described, Rogers involved the segregation of African-American patients and a
complaint by a Hispanic employee. 63
356. Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
357.454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
786 (1998) (citing Rogers as the origin ofthe Court's hostile work environmentjurisprudence);
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,66-67 (1986) (relying extensively and approvingly
on Rogers).
358. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 236.
359. Id. at 238. Indeed, Judge Goldberg stated explicitly that "petitioners' failure to direct
intentionally any discriminatory treatment toward Mrs. Chavez is simply not material to the
finding of an unlawful employment practice." Id. at 239.
360. Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
361. Indeed, the opinion seeminglyauthorizes a cause ofaction foranyemployeerequired
to work in an environment charged with discrimination. Cf. supra text accompanying note 130.
362. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
363. For references to Rogers as involving segregation of Hispanic patients, see, for
example, Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66; Sarah E. Bums, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Workplace:
What Is It and How Should It Be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.?, 21 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357,363 (1994); Franke, supra note 10, at 708. Rogers arose from an
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Although no court has commented on this aspect of Rogers, the racial difference
between the overt objects of discrimination and the plaintiff posed no barrier to
plaintiffs hostile work environment claim. What matters is whether the work
environment is personally abusive because of plaintiff's race or sex, not whether the
environment is "about" the plaintiff s race or gender.
Whether this is so depends on the employee's relationship to that environment.
Thus, a work environment may be hostile to some but not all women,a" and when the
workplace environment expresses hostility to members of one group, members of
other groups may well also experience it as hostile. Consider a hypothetical
workplace containing members of the American Nazi Party who cost Barbara Herzon
herjob when she hired an African-American.365 The neo-Nazis render the workplace
pervasively hostile to African-Americans through racially specific abuse. Barbara
Herzon is hired. She is Jewish, but no one in the workplace knows this; no
specifically anti-Semitic acts occur. Herzon, however, is well aware that, for neo-
Nazis at least, racism and anti-Semitism go hand-in-hand. The "closeted" Herzon may
well experience the environment as hostile to herself on account of her Jewishness,
and reasonably so, even though no harassment has been knowingly "directed" at her,
nor has the environment included any reference to "her" group.
Such an environment fits Clark Freshman's "generalized discrimination" modelM
in which the discriminator does not distinguish among occupants of a wide range of
race, sex, and other protected positions but instead practices either "in-group"
favoritism towards a favored class (such as whites) or "out-group hostility" towards
nonmembers of favored classes (such as nonwhites).367 Presumably a similar dynamic
effort by the EEOC to enforce its request for information in the course of an investigation, and
the demand with which Rogers refused to comply inquired, "Does Texas State Optical instruct
its employees at any of its Houston facilities to fill in Negro patients' applications for service
with red ink or red pencil and to use black or blue ink or pencil for patients other than
Negroes[?]" Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422, 424 n.1 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
364. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (requiring that plaintiff
subjectively experience the workplace as hostile because otherwise "the conduct has not
actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment"). Thus, f6r instance, a female
employee who shared and embraced her employer's gender stereotypes could not claim that
reliance on such stereotypes created a hostile work environment. Of course, conformity to
normative femininity may be incompatible with being welcomed as a competent coworker and
competence as a coworker may require violation of normative femininity. This is the Catch-22
in which Ann Hopkins was caught. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989); see also CYNTHIA COCKBURN, IN THE WAY OF WOMEN: MEN'S RESISTANCE TO SEX
EQUAUTY WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS 155 (1993); Yount, supra note 25, at 402 ("Demandingthat
she be treated like a miner, however, meant inclusion in highly sexualized banter that was
normative among men but which held a different significance for women in that the talk
frequently conveyed a shared understanding of women as sexual objects.")
365. See supra text accompanying notes 152-62.
366. See Freshman, BeyondAtomized Discrimination, supra note 159, at244-45; see also
Freshman, Whatever Happened to "Anti-Semitism"?, supra note 72, at 320-26.
367. Freshman, WhateverHappenedto "Anti-Semitism "?, supra note 72, at 322; see also
Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560,570 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Remarks targeting members of
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was at work in Rogers, in which a Hispanic woman might reasonably have inferred
hostility based on her own race from racism toward African-Americans.
3. Crossing Boundaries Between Members of "In" and "Out" Groups
The relationship between discrimination against women and African-Americans
in the Richmond police department and the Childress plaintiffs' position as white
men is not, however, one of straightforward analogy. Although Chavez and the
hypothetical Herzon experienced their environments as abusive because they
imagined themselves as like the targeted African-Americans, swept within
indiscriminate hostility to racialized "others," the racism and sexism polluting the
Childress work environment positioned white males as superior to and different from
women and people of color. Freshman's "generalized discrimination" cannot apply
without further elaboration.368
The necessary refinement recognizes the potential gap between workplace
expectations of white men and the lived experiences and commitments of particular
individuals, the possible space between stereotype and reality. Racial categorization
as white and sexual categorization as male may be necessary but not sufficient for
inclusion within a workplace environment that privileges white-maleness.369 Just as
harassment based on fitting stereotypes may create an environment hostile to some
but not all women, workplace environments hostile to women may also be hostile to
men who fail or refuse to conform to normative conceptions of masculinity.370 In
specifying that women and minorities are to be marginalized, subordinated,
sexualized, or excluded, workplace norms may simultaneously specify, and enact, that
whites and men are to marginalize, subordinate, sexualize, and exclude. One would
expect all women or people of color to experience such an environment as hostile
because of their race or sex, but the same could be true of those whites or men in
conflict with the race- or sex-specific normative roles the environment demands of
them.
Consider the story ofDenise Chacon, a white woman married to a Hispanic man."'
Her supervisor, who knew of the marriage, made derogatory remarks about
other minorities... may contribute to the overall hostility of the working environment for a
minority employee.").
368. Cf. O'Connor, supra note 15, at 538-39 (distinguishing claims by "bystanders" of
the same sex as the "target" of discrimination from those by persons of different sex).
369. See supra Part IV.B. 1.
370. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 1225-26 (arguing that "[s]anctioning men who do not
manifest prototypical, (hetero-)sexualized masculinity is an important way of entrenching
masculine norms in the workplace"); Franke, supra note 10, at 757 & n. 353 (stating that some
environments hostile to women may also be hostile to men "who do not conform to hetero-
patriarchal expectations"); Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at
1787 ("[O]nce a sexual desire model is abandoned, the fact that the men who harass seek to
police their occupational boundaries against both women and nonconforming men might be
evidence that the harassment of each group is based on gender.") (emphasis in original).
371. Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
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Hispanics, mimicked and mocked them, and told offensive jokes about Mexicans. 72
Chacon claimed a hostile environment based on her race, and the defendant,
predictably, claimed that the behavior complained of could only constitute
discrimination against Hispanics and not against a white person. 3
Chacon demonstrates the futility of using "at whom is the discrimination directed"
as a helpful limiting principle. There were no Latinos in Chacon's workplace, and yet
Chacon's white supervisor insistently ridiculed Latinos in her presence. Although
these remarks did not refer to Chacon, they were certainly directed at her and
reflected on her interracial relationship. In other words, discriminatory comments or
actions overtly aimed at one group may have nonmembers as their audience." Given
the context, ajury could reasonably conclude that the supervisor's invective reflected
a white supremacist attitude with respect to Hispanics, and one facet of this attitude
was belief in the inappropriateness of a white woman's intimate relationship with a
Hispanic man.375
The same analysis applies to the racist and sexist commentary that Lieutenant
Carroll offered to an audience of white men and to requests that a member of one
group take discriminatory action against another: the request refers to one group and
yet is directed at another.376 There is simply no reason to assume, as the Fourth
Circuit did in Childress, that one is necessarily a mere bystander whenever comments
refer to, or discriminatory actions are directed against, other groups. To the contrary,
racially or sexually hostile behavior towards absent groups may set an example for
those present and seek to affirm a common racial or gender identity.
A work environment's hostility to persons engaging in intergroup solidaritybegins
when they reasonably experience it as hostile, not only when they are personally
targeted. Courts should recognize the continuity between workplace actions that
express race- or sex-based norms of intergroup behavior-including ones in which
372. Id. at 680 & n. 1.
373. Id. at 681.
374. See Christine E. Sleeter, White Silence, While Solidarity, in RACE TRAITOR 257,261
(Noel Ignatiev & John Garvey eds., 1996) (discussing phenomenon of "white racial bonding"
in which conversations among whites ostensibly "about" African-Americans serve to reinforce
conversants' common white racial identity); Proudford, supra note 12, at 631 (using example
of conversations among whites concerning affirmative action to illustrate how intragroup
relations are constructed through references to intergroup interactions); Raab, supra note 37
(noting that one way a white worker who opposed discrimination against African-Americans
was harassed was by leaving pornographic pictures of blacks on his desk).
375. See supra note 206-07 and accompanying text (discussing Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967)).
376. A variant on this notion has been accepted in situations in which actions taken
against one person are construed as retaliation against another. See De Medina v. Reinhardt,
444 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D.D.C. 1978) (allowing plaintiff to proceed with Title VII claim for
retaliation based on reprisals for her husband's protected activity because "tolerance of third-
party reprisals would, no less than the tolerance of direct reprisals, deter persons from
exercising their protected rights"), aff'd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 686
F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541,543-44 (6th Cir.
1993) (following De Medina).
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that expression is conveyed through acting out those norms in concrete acts of
discrimination-and workplace actions that enforce those norms againstpersons who
reject them in favor of intergroup solidarity.
C. Meeting the Standard of Harm in Workplaces Hostile to Intergroup Solidarity
I have argued that white or male employees maybe implicated, based on their race
or sex, in practices of discrimination against other groups. My focus has been those
who violate stereotyped expectations of how they should interact with members of
other groups. But, of course, too many employees conform, passively or actively, to
such stereotypes. Had the Childress plaintiffs joined in the harassment of their female
and African-American peers, surely they could not claim to have suffered a hostile
environment because of race and sex; one might be similarly skeptical had they
remained purely passive bystanders.37 Indeed, the Childress court assumed that
unambiguously misogynist and antiblack comments could not create a hostile
environment for white men because they would feel favored, not threatened, by such
an atmosphere.37
When plaintiffs suffer such individualized harms as attacks, threats, work
sabotage, or unfair task assignments as a result of their intergroup solidarity, it is easy
to see why they would experience the workplace as hostile or abusive, and so the
critical question is simply whether these harms flowed because of sex or race. But
subjective reactions to an "abusive working environment" may also contribute to its
being "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment., 379 Harris not only emphasized such experiential reactions as
intimidation, insult, humiliation, and discouragement, but specificallynotedthatsuch
reactions need not either "seriously affect employees' psychological well-being" or
result in "tangible effects" such as deterioration ofjob performance or interference
with career advancement.30 This experience of hostility, however, mustbereasonable
and must derive from more serious circumstances than "mere utterance of an...
epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee. '381
Courts considering hostile work environment claims like those in Childress have
been deeply skeptical that plaintiffs could meet this standard. Although some claims
will certainly fail on this point, it is important to distinguish the practical difficulty
of establishing a discrimination claim on a particular theory from the categorical
377. In many of the third-party standing cases, for instance, plaintiffs alleged only that
theiremployerhad discriminated against members ofother groups in hiring, pay, orpromotion.
Without a basis not only for imputing any expectation of plaintiffs' intergroup behavior, but
also for concluding that the plaintiffs ran afoul of such an expectation, there would be no claim
that plaintiffs were themselves discriminated against, even though their claims might go
forward under a theory of third-party standing.
378. Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 938-39 (E.D. Va. 1995).
379. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)) (internal citations omitted).
380. Id. at 22.
381. Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
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rejection of the possibility.3 2 Unfortunately, courts entrenched in the zero-sum view
of discrimination refuse to accept that white or male workers could ever reasonably
find a work environment severely or pervasively hostile on account of white or male
coworkers' discriminatory attitudes and practices towards others. As a result, they not
only dismiss out of tand white or male workers' claims of subjective experiences of
workplace hostility, but also refuse to see the sometimes obvious connections
between such experiences and blatant incidents of harassment.
1. The Reasonable Commitment to Intergroup Solidarity
Courts have frequently belittled the idea that whites or men might find hostile
those workplaces in which intergroup hostility is the norm, even when plaintiffs have
actively resisted such practices and have been personally targeted for abusive
behavior.383 This incredulity reflects both assumptions about intractable, zero-sum
intergroup conflict, and a broader tendency to undermine hostile work environment
claims by disaggregating superficially different workplace behaviors rather than
considering the hostility of the environment as a whole.3
Courts often fail to acknowledge the intergroup aspects of the behavior at issue,
instead seeing actions directed at one group without ever considering the race- or sex-
specific actors originating the behavior: the actions go to one group but come from
none in particular. From this perspective, whites or men simply have no stake in
discriminatory behavior directed at other groups, and courts articulate their position
382. Oncale illustrates this approach, rejecting a per se bar on same-sex harassment claims
in favor of applying the general Title VII requirements of impermissible causation and
cognizable harm. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(noting that fears of overbreadth are "adequately met by careful attention to the requirements
of the statute"). Procedurally, the question of whether Title VII protection is available for
persons alleging race or sex discrimination as a consequence of their intergroup solidarity has
generally arisen on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment.
Courts like those in Lyman and Childress have typically ruled not that plaintiffs have produced
insufficient evidence of discrimination because of race or sex but that as a matter of law the
facts they alleged could not make out a claim for Title VII discrimination. Childress, 907 F.
Supp. at 940 (dismissing white men's complaints for failure to state a claim); Lyman v. Nabil's,
Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1443, 1445-48 (D. Kan. 1995) (dismissing male employee's discrimination
complaint for failure to state a claim). The Second Circuit took the better approach in Leibovitz
v. N. Y. Transit Authority, in which it eschewed any categorical rule against claims brought by
individuals who were not individually targeted by harassment and instead ruled against plaintiff
by applying the general principle that the work environment's hostility must be severe or
pervasive for it to be actionable under Title VII. 252 F.3d 179, 188-90 (2d Cir. 2001); see also
supra note 355. Notably Leibovitz's connection to the harassment was far more tenuous than
was the plaintiffs' in Childress, Lyman, and most of the other cases discussed in this Article.
383. See Drake v. 3M, 134 F.3d 878, 883-85 (7th Cir. 1998); Childress, 907 F. Supp. at
939-40; Lyman, 903 F. Supp. at 1446-48.
384. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 1714, 1798
(criticizing disaggregation of sexual from nonsexual forms of harassment and of harassment
from other forms of discrimination).
[Vol. 77:63
BEYOND THE ZERO-SUM GAME
as third-partybystanders.385 InBermudez v. TRCHoldings, Inc.," 6 for instance, Linda
Schlichting, a white woman, worked in a firm in which the Seventh Circuit found
triable evidence of discrimination against African-Americans, in which Schlichting
was asked directly to cater to white clients' preferences for white workers, and in
which other white employees were rewarded for complicity in racial discrimination.8 7
Nonetheless, the court dismissed Schlichting's complaints of a hostile work
environment because this behavior "posed no threat to her personally" as one who
was merely a "bystander[] appalled to learn that discrimination is ongoing."" In this
worldview, discrimination simply occurs in the passive voice: it happens to certain
groups but is not done by anyone in particular, and even explicit expectations of
complicity still leave workers mere bystanders. By refusing to see that actions toward
one group may also be from another, courts fail to recognize how persons in the
originating group might reasonably experience as hostile a workplace in which
complicity was expected and resistance punished.
In Childress, Judge Williams expressed the more extreme view that members of
groups expected to participate in discriminatory intergroup behaviors are positioned
not as bystanders but as beneficiaries. But the question of whether it is unreasonable
for an individual -white or male employee to view as personally hostile any
expectations of complicity in discrimination against others must be distinguished
from that of whether discrimination may, in aggregate, offer workplace advantages
to one's group. By collapsing the two, the court suggests that white or male
employees ought to experience a discriminatory atmosphere as especially welcoming,
and that those who feel otherwise are unreasonable.
Such a view turns Title VII values on their head by suggesting that, as a matter of
law, workers embrace the very practices the statute outlaws. The "reasonable person"
standard should never be confused with the perspective of the ordinary bigot or
passive beneficiary of discrimination, regardless oftheirnumerical incidence. Instead,
as Kathryn Abrams has argued, the only way to insure that Title VII's objective harm
requirement reflects the statute's normative, and transformative, aspirations is to
incorporate into the legal standard of "reasonableness" an appreciation of Title VII's
commitment to workplace equality and a thoroughgoing understanding ofthe barriers
to it.389 The "reasonable" worker does not take for granted a workplace structured by
385. Similarly, commentators consistently characterize whites and men in workplaces
plagued by discrimination toward members of other groups as having merely an "indirect"
relationship to the discrimination, that is, they are not directly implicated in its racial and
gender dynamics but are brought in only by the mediating role of its victims. See, e.g., Brady,
supra note 15, at 424 (characterizing Childress as involving "indirect discrimination"); Jordan,
supra note 15, at 135-36.
386. 138 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1998).
387. Id. at 1178,1180.
388. Id. at 1181.
389. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 1177-78, 1223 -24 (arguing that the "reasonable person"
should be "a well informed person, a person armed with context-specific information" about
sexual harassment); see also Franke, supra note 10, at 751-52 (discussing Kathryn Abrams,




race- and sex-based competition or antagonism.
The zero-sumperspective also leaves courts blind to quite concrete harms suffered
by workers whose intergroup solidarity the courts find so unreasonable. The assertion
in Childress that the officers should have experienced the workplace favorably simply
contradicts the evidence that their intergroup solidarity provoked a pattern of hostile
and harmful behavior.3" To similar effect, courts also trivialize the possibility of
reasonably experiencing a workplace as hostile by disaggregating different
components of the workplace environment. The Drake court concluded that Drake's
coworker's comment "Why don't you take your nose and put it up the black's ass like
you have always got it and keep it there?"39' was merely "an isolated incident" that
could not support a claim of a hostile environment,392 but it failed to consider the
racially explicit comment in light of the "evidence that some of the employees...
were racial bigots"393 and that coworkers shunned Drake by leaving the plant's
breakroom whenever he entered.3 '
If every incident is considered in isolation, it is trivial to conclude that each is an
isolated incident. But a critique of the zero-sum model demonstrates how behavior
directed at members of a "favored" workplace group must be understood together
with discriminatory conduct towards others, with particular attention to whether
individual employees embrace or reject the offer of "favored" status.
2. Proving Subjective Harm
Even if workers ought to experience as hostile, and to resist, any workplace
pressures to participate in discriminatory practices, they too often fail to do so. The
traditional arguments against third-party standing, the doctrinal requirements of Title
VII claims, and the policy goal of encouraging voluntary, grassroots intergroup
solidarity all counsel caution in permitting members of dominant workplace groups
to bring suit based on workplace environments that primarily victimize members of
marginalized or excluded groups. In a case like Childress, the legitimate worry is that
whites or men might claim a racially or sexually hostile environment even though
they were indifferent to, preferred, or even promoted that environment.
In many situations, subjective harm may be established by the obviously abusive
character of the harassment directed at the plaintiff. Physical attacks, work sabotage,
public humiliation, and other targeted harassment would support inferences of
subjective harm without requiring other assurances that a plaintiff found the
environment to be hostile. In such circumstances, the plaintiff s coworkers make clear
390. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 938 (E.D. Va. 1995). Cf
Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 8, at 1805 (describing how courts describe women's jobs
as "more desirable" than men's "even where women's jobs pay lower wages, afford less
prestige, and offer fewer opportunities for advancement" based on "the courts' own
construction of women's point of view").
391. Drake v. 3M, 134 F.3d 878, 882 (7th Cir. 1998).
392. Id. at 885.
393. Id. at 881.
394. See id. at 882.
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plaintiffs divergence from a workplace orthodoxy.395
In other cases, such divergence is made publicly apparent by the plaintiff's own
conduct, whether through explicit objection to norms disfavoring intergroup solidarity
or by direct violation ofthose norms.31 Such self-identification makes it plausible for
the employee to treat workplace demands for discriminatory intergroup relations as
threats to his or her own employment security.
397
Without either harassing conduct specifically directed at the plaintiff or some
assertion of intergroup solidarity, however, it is difficult to see how the subjective
harm requirement can be satisfied. Even when a white or male employee is personally
implicated in discriminatory conduct by virtue of sex- or race-specific expectations
of intragroup cooperation in such conduct, there is no reason simply to assume that
the employee finds the subjection to such stereotypes to be threatening, humiliating,
or otherwise giving rise to a hostile or abusive environment. In Bermudez, for
instance, Schlichting was not simply a racial bystander,39" but the reported facts leave
no basis to infer that she found a workplace culture where white intraracial solidarity
manifested itselfin race discrimination against nonwhites to be alienating and hostile,
rather than reassuring, or that any discomfort with the situation rose beyond the level
395. Thus, I disagree with Katherine Franke's suggestion that, for same-sex harassment
to be actionable, the law always should require the plaintiff to indicate his objections to
workplace norms and then bring a Title VII action only after he "is targeted for hostile
treatment because of his failure to conform to the workplace norms." Franke, supra note 10,
at 768. An explicit objection is not required to distinguish employees who oppose the
behavioral expectations of the workplace from those affirmed by or indifferent to them.
Moreover, Franke's proposal runs contrary to the principle that workplace conduct that does
not individually target the plaintiff may nonetheless give rise to a hostile environment. See
supra Part V.B.
396. See, e.g., Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1982);
Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 597 F.2d 1104, 1106-08 (7th Cir. 1979); Spillman
v. Carter, 918 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D. Kan. 1996); Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 660 F. Supp.
1388, 1389-90 (D. Colo. 1987). There is no need, however, that the employer know of this
commitment to intergroup solidarity. If, for instance, David DeMatteis had known with
confidence (perhaps by observing prior incidents) that discovery by his white coworkers of his
sale of his home to an African-American coworker would have led to such severe harassment
as to paralyze his ability to do his job, threaten him with physical injury, and jeopardize his
health, he might well reasonably have found the constant threat of being "outed" (and the
consequences to follow) sufficient to render the work environment severely hostile. Cf
Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by 'Unenforced" Sodomy
Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103 (2000) (discussing the harms inflicted on gays and
lesbians by being coerced into remaining closeted for fear of exposing themselves to antigay
violence, harassment, and other forms of discrimination).
397. Such considerations rely on the credibility ofdifficult-to-verify claims about how the
plaintiff experienced the workplace. But evidence might be found in deteriorating work
performance associated with changes in theworkplace environment, communications aboutthe
workplace with friends and coworkers, or the need for medical treatment of the psychological
consequences of the environment.
398. See supra Part V.C. 1.
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of mere offended sensibilities.
Even though anyone in a discriminatory work environment ought to experience
that environment as profoundly hostile, such environments persist in part because the
opposite is too often true: workers' confidence in and comfort with themselves as
white or male mayrely on, orbe untroubled by, practices of intergroup exclusion and
subordination. Title VII coverage should encourage a realignment of those
environments workers experience as hostile, rather than give comfort to the
sensibilities that aid and abet discrimination. It is entirely appropriate, then, to require
that plaintiffs demonstrate their actual experience of workplace harm and to favor
plaintiffs whose conduct reflects their rejection of exclusionary or subordinating
intergroup norms and their commitment to intergroup solidarity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Title VII enshrines in law an aspiration for an American workplace structured
around intergroup solidarity rather than race- and sex-based competition, exclusion,
and hierarchy. Title VII jurisprudence cannot do justice to that dream while beholden
to the same zero-sum model of race and gender relations that underpins so much
discrimination itself. Moving beyond the zero-sum game requires recognizing how
practices of racism and sexism are not simply about abstract valuations of different
kinds of persons, or even just about stereotypic race- or gender-specific norms, but
also are about maintaining systems of relationships between and within groups. As
Chantal Mouffe has put it, "the struggle for the equality of women.. . [is not] a
struggle for realizing the equality of a definable empirical group with a common
essence or identity, women, but rather [is] a struggle against the multiple forms in
which the category 'woman' is constructed in subordination."3' When intergroup
interactions become intragroup conditions of membership, regulating those
interactions promotes particular forms of race and gender relations while
simultaneously demarcating the very groups that interact.
Recognizing this point allows us to understand how Title VII's prohibition on
same-sex and same-race discrimination can play an integral role in the statute's core
pursuit of racial and gender equity, rather than being merely a curious byproduct of
its structure.4° Moreover, conceptualizing race and gender not as static attributes but
as social processes may help us to see the discrimination, often overlooked, that
inheres in the relationship between workers in female- or minority-dominated job
categories and their supervisors, customers, or clients, rather than focusing
exclusively on the disparate treatment of similarly situated employees.40 1 Moving
beyond the zero-sum game will enable us to understand these dynamics and to protect
399. Chantal Mouffe, Feminism, Citizenship, and Radical Democratic Politics, in
FEMINiSTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 369, 382 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992).
400. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 1225 (arguing that same-sex harassment should be
actionable "through its connection to a system of sex and gender subordination"); cf. Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (characterizing same-sex
harassment as "not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII").
401. Cf. supra note 271 (discussing courts' reluctance to find sex discrimination absent
comparative disadvantage between men and women).
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attempts, by persons of all races and genders, to construct new ways of life and work
in the spirit of equality.

